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This paper considers self-enforcing trade agreements among privately informed governments. A trade
agreement that uses weak bindings (i.e., maximal tariff levels) is shown to offer advantages relative
to a trade agreement that uses strong bindings (i.e., precise tariff levels). Consistent with practice,
the theory also predicts that governments sometimes apply tariffs that are strictly below their bound
rates. When private information is persistent through time, an enforcement "ratchet effect" is identified:
a government reveals that it is "weak," and thus that it is unlikely to retaliate in an effective manner,
when it applies a low tariff. This effect suggests that a government with a low type may "pool" at an
above-optimal tariff, in order to conceal weakness. It also suggests a new information-based theory









When a government imposes an import tari⁄, the tari⁄ lowers the world price at which foreign
exporters sell and thus induces a terms-of-trade loss for the foreign country. A trade agreement
that features reciprocal liberalization can then be mutually bene￿cial for governments by raising
trade volumes to more e¢ cient levels, where e¢ ciency is measured relative to the political-economic
preferences of governments.1 A cooperative trade agreement of this kind, however, can be achieved
only if it is self-enforcing.2 In other words, cooperation can be achieved only if each government
perceives that its short-term bene￿t of cheating is outweighed by the expected discounted future
cost of the consequent deterioration in cooperation.
When governments design a self-enforcing trade agreement, a further complication is that they
may be uncertain about the political pressures that they will face in the future. Governments then
cannot know with certainty the tari⁄ levels that will be e¢ cient from their joint perspective in
future periods. Of course, if political pressures were publicly observable, then governments could
design a state-contingent agreement, in which they agree to apply the tari⁄s that are e¢ cient
given whatever future preferences they may hold. Broad movements in political pressures may be
publicly observable; however, at any given point in time, each government is likely to possess some
private information about the extent of its political pressures. This information may pertain to
transitory ￿ uctuations in political pressures, but it is also plausible that a government possesses
private information about political pressures that have persistent components.3
Private information introduces an incentive-compatibility problem. If the trade agreement is
designed to allow a government to apply a high tari⁄ when it reports a high degree of pressure
from its import-competing industry, then even a government with low pressure may be tempted to
￿lie￿and apply the high tari⁄, as it thereby enjoys a terms-of-trade gain. The presence of private
information may also interact with the requirement that the trade agreement be self-enforcing. This
interaction arises when the pressures that a government privately observes have persistent compo-
nents. In that case, if a government applies a low tari⁄, then another government may perceive that
the former government faces persistent and low political pressures. The former government then
may be perceived as ￿weak￿and thus unlikely to retaliate aggressively should another government
cheat. Once this inference is made, the trade agreement may fail to be self-enforcing.
In sum, when governments design a trade agreement while recognizing that they will each
possess private information in the future, they may seek to lower average tari⁄s, so as to address
the terms-of-trade externality, and to allow each government some discretion when applying its
1For further discussion of the terms-of-trade rationale for trade agreements between governments with political-
economic preferences, see Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001, 2002) and Grossman and Helpman (1995).
2The view that trade agreements must be self-enforcing is advanced by Bagwell and Staiger (1990, 2002), Dixit
(1987) and Maggi (1999), for example.
3International relations scholars advance similar perspectives. For example, Frieden (1999) emphasizes that the
motivations of governments are not publicly observable; Tomz (2007) studies international debt and provides evidence
that governments are privately informed about their preference types, where a government￿ s type exhibits imperfect
persistence through time; and Coneybeare (1987) argues that some historical trade wars resulted from a misperception
by one government as to how essential its export goods were to another government.
1tari⁄, so as to facilitate better matching between a government￿ s applied tari⁄ and its (privately
observed) political pressures. Finally, governments must recognize as well that, if the bene￿ts of
better matching are realized, then a government￿ s applied tari⁄ may reveal its private information.
If private information is persistent in nature, this revelation could in turn interact with the self-
enforcement constraint, by altering another government￿ s perception as to the severity of retaliation
that it would face in the future were it to cheat today.
This discussion suggests a potential framework for interpreting an important design feature
of the GATT/WTO. Under GATT/WTO rules, governments do not negotiate ￿strong bindings￿
(i.e., precise tari⁄ levels); instead, they negotiate ￿weak bindings￿ (i.e., maximal tari⁄ levels).
With an agreement to use a weak binding, a government thus agrees not to apply its tari⁄ on the
relevant product at a level that exceeds the bound rate. The government is free, however, to exercise
￿downward discretion￿and apply a tari⁄ below the bound rate. The preceding discussion suggests
that such a design could be attractive to governments as a way of lowering the average tari⁄ while
facilitating improved downward matching between a government￿ s applied tari⁄ and its political
pressure. In fact, many governments often do apply tari⁄s that are strictly below their negotiated
tari⁄ bindings. The discussion suggests as well, however, that governments might sometimes resist
applying tari⁄s below their bound levels, in order not to be perceived as weak.
In this paper, we pursue these themes at a formal level. We do so by developing a theory of
self-enforcing trade agreements among privately informed governments, where the private informa-
tion that governments possess may be persistent through time. We ￿rst put the self-enforcement
constraint to the side and develop a number of new ￿ndings for a static model. We then consider
a sequence of dynamic models, in which a government￿ s private information is transitory, perfectly
persistent and imperfectly persistent, respectively, in order to better understand the implications
of private information for the design of self-enforcing trade agreements.
Our main ￿ndings for the static model are as follows. We show that an agreement to use
a weak binding o⁄ers governments greater expected joint welfare than they can achieve with an
agreement to use a strong binding or in the absence of an agreement. We also observe that applied
tari⁄s are often below the bound level, when governments agree to the optimal weak binding. As
suggested above, a weak bound on tari⁄s limits the extent to which tari⁄s can impose terms-of-
trade externalities while at the same time allowing downward discretion so as to facilitate a better
match between a government￿ s applied tari⁄ and its level of political pressure. A strong binding,
by contrast, limits externalities but eliminates all discretion. Perhaps surprisingly, we ￿nd that an
agreement to use the optimal strong binding may o⁄er less expected joint welfare to governments
than they achieve in the absence of an agreement. Moreover, we show that the expected applied
tari⁄is higher under an agreement to use the optimal weak binding than under an agreement to use
the optimal strong binding. Finally, we characterize the incentive-compatible tari⁄s that maximize
expected joint welfare for governments and show that such second-best tari⁄s entail a novel pattern
of distortions and cannot be implemented using weak or strong bindings.
In our analyses of dynamic models, we show that the applied tari⁄s induced by the optimal weak
2binding can be achieved as part of a self-enforcing agreement among patient governments when
private information is transitory; however, an enforcement ￿ratchet e⁄ect￿ arises when political
pressures are perfectly persistent, in that a government that exercises downward discretion and
applies a tari⁄ below the optimal weak binding reveals that it faces little pressure and thus that it
would be unlikely to retaliate in an e⁄ective way were its trading partner to cheat on the agreement.
In response to this problem, a government with low pressure may ￿pool￿and apply a tari⁄ at the
bound rate and in excess of its optimal level, in order not to be perceived as weak. We also show that
the ratchet e⁄ect may be overcome when political pressures are imperfectly persistent: governments
that are su¢ ciently patient are then able to achieve the applied tari⁄s induced by the optimal weak
binding as part of a self-enforcing agreement. To achieve these tari⁄s in a self-enforcing agreement,
governments must be more patient when political pressures are more persistent.
For the dynamic model with perfectly persistent types, we also explore an information-based
theory of gradualism in trade agreements, in which the tari⁄s that governments apply under an
initial agreement reveal information about the persistent pressures that they face and thus guide
the determination of the bound tari⁄ rates that they negotiate in a subsequent agreement. In
the equilibrium that we feature, a government with low pressure applies a tari⁄ that is below the
bound rate in the initial agreement and then applies a lower tari⁄ that is equal to the (reduced)
bound rate in the subsequent agreement. The theory entails ￿dynamic screening￿ and suggests
that applied tari⁄s are more likely to be below bound rates in early negotiation rounds. The theory
thus suggests that ￿binding overhang￿should decline over time for a given country and may be
larger across countries for new WTO members.4 For any positive discount factor that governments
may possess and regardless of the pressures that they face, we show that the featured equilibrium
generates strictly higher payo⁄s for governments than they achieve in the absence of an agreement.
This paper contributes to the literature at three levels. First, at a methodological level, this
paper contributes to the theory of trade agreements among governments with private information.
Building on recent work on collusion among privately informed ￿rms by Athey and Bagwell (2001,
2008) and Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004), this paper joins a small and recent literature that
explores self-enforcing trade agreements among privately informed governments. This literature
includes Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Lee (2007) and Martin and Vergote (2008).5 With the excep-
tion of Athey and Bagwell (2008), all of these papers assume that private information is transitory.
When private information exhibits persistence, the analysis becomes more complex, since a player￿ s
behavior may signal his information and thereby a⁄ect the beliefs of other players. The present
paper appears to be the ￿rst analysis of self-enforcing trade agreements between governments with
4Bchir, Sebastien and Laborde (2005) report that the recent extent of binding overhang is on average greater for
developing than developed countries. Binding overhang is more signi￿cant in some developing countries than others,
and binding overhang is also signi￿cant in some developed countries (e.g., some members of EFTA). Many developing
countries are new WTO members, having joined in the Uruguay Round.
5See also Feenstra and Lewis (1991) and Park (2006). Feenstra and Lewis (1991) consider trade policies among
privately informed governments in a static model that allows for transfers between governments. We require here that
trade agreements are self-enforcing and do not permit transfers. Park (2006) considers self-enforcing trade agreements
among governments that observe private signals about the levels of concealed trade barriers.
3persistent private information. Methodologically, the analysis found here also di⁄ers from that in
Athey and Bagwell (2008), since the trade application results in a signi￿cantly di⁄erent structure
for payo⁄ functions.6
Second, at a substantive level, this paper o⁄ers new insights with respect to use of bound and
applied tari⁄s in trade agreements. In both the static and dynamic models, we identify circum-
stances under which governments with low political pressures apply tari⁄s that are strictly below
their bound rates. This ￿nding is also developed by Bagwell and Staiger (2005).7 The present
paper di⁄ers on several important dimensions. In the present paper, we extract additional pre-
dictions by using a two-type (as opposed to a continuum-type) model. For example, in the static
analysis, we present several new results, including the ￿nding that an agreement to use the optimal
strong binding may be worse for governments than having no agreement whatsoever and also the
characterization of second-best tari⁄s. In the dynamic model, the two-type framework is su¢ -
ciently tractable that we can analyze and compare self-enforcing trade agreements when private
information is transitory, perfectly persistent and imperfectly persistent. We show that the self-
enforcement constraint requires greater patience from governments when their private information
is more persistent. We also identify a new ratchet e⁄ect and characterize novel pooling behavior
when private information is persistent.
Finally, this paper contributes to an established literature that considers explanations for the
gradual manner in which trade is liberalized over time through GATT/WTO rounds. For example,
Devereux (1997), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) and Staiger (1995) provide models in which
liberalization leads to changes in structural variables (associated with learning by doing, the alloca-
tion of capital and worker locations, respectively), which in turn interact with the self-enforcement
constraints in a way that makes further liberalization possible.8 As discussed above, we present
here a new information-based foundation for gradualism in trade agreements
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic model of trade. Results for the
static model are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze the repeated game with transitory
shocks, while Section 5 contains our analysis of the dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks.
The dynamic game with imperfectly peristent shocks is considered in Section 6. In Section 7, we
present our results on gradualism. Section 8 concludes. Remaining proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section, we present our basic model of trade, and we characterize Nash and e¢ cient tari⁄
choices. We also consider incentive-compatible trade policies.
6This point is developed further in the ￿nal paragraph of Section 3.
7Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2006) develop a related ￿nding in a static model without private information that
allows for contracting costs. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) analyze a model in which applied tari⁄s are set at
bound levels in equilibrium; yet, the potential for governments to apply a tari⁄ below the bound level encourages
ex post lobbying and mitigates an overinvestment problem. If import-competing ￿rms are risk averse, a government
may also keep its applied tari⁄ below the bound rate in order to create policy space, so that the applied tari⁄ can
adjust to world-price ￿ uctuations and reduce local-price variability. See, for example, Bagwell and Sykes (2004).
8For other models of gradualism, see Bond and Park (2002), Chisik (2003) and Furusawa and Lai (1999).
42.1 Basic Set Up
We consider a partial-equilibrium model in which trade occurs in two goods between two countries.
The home country exports good y and imports good x; while the foreign country exports good x
and imports good y: Let Px and Py denote the local prices of goods x and y; respectively, in the
home country. Using an asterisk to denote foreign country variables, we denote the local prices
of goods x and y in the foreign country as P￿
x and P￿
y, respectively. Each good is produced and
demanded in each country. We assume that demand functions are symmetric across goods and
countries. Gains from trade arise, since the two countries have di⁄erent domestic supply functions.
The demand and supply functions take simple linear forms. For good i = x;y, the home-country
demand function is D(Pi) = 1￿Pi, and the foreign-country demand function is D(P￿
i ) = 1￿P￿
i : The







y=2, respectively.9 Notice that the countries are symmetric, in that
the supply functions in the foreign country are the mirror image of those in the home country.







y)2=4. Finally, we de￿ne home- and foreign-country import












The government of each country selects a speci￿c import tari⁄. Let ￿ and ￿￿ respectively denote
the tari⁄s of the home- and foreign-country governments. Market-clearing prices are determined
once the tari⁄s are imposed. Home-country exporters of good y receive the world price Pw
y ￿ Py,
and foreign-country exporters of good x sell at the world price Pw
x ￿ P￿
x: Provided that tari⁄s
do not prohibit trade, the local price for an imported good is determined as Px = Pw
x + ￿ and
P￿
y = Pw
y + ￿￿: With these relationships in place, we may determine the market-clearing world
prices, Pw
x (￿) and Pw
y (￿￿); as the world prices that respectively satisfy the following market-clearing
conditions: Mx(Pw
x + ￿) = E￿
x(Pw
x ) and M￿
y(Pw
y + ￿￿) = Ey(Pw
y ): The remaining local prices are
then determined as b Px(￿) ￿ Pw
x (￿) + ￿ and b P￿
y(￿￿) ￿ Pw
y (￿￿) + ￿￿: The explicit solutions are
Pw
x (￿) = [4￿3￿]=7, Pw
y (￿￿) = [4￿3￿￿]=7, b Px(￿) = 4[1+￿]=7 and b P￿
y(￿￿) = 4[1+￿￿]=7 for ￿ < 1=6
and ￿￿ < 1=6: Trade in a good is prohibited if the import tari⁄ on that good equals or exceeds 1=6:
We now consider government preferences. Following Baldwin (1987), we assume that each
government maximizes a weighted sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and tari⁄ revenue,
where due to political-economy pressures each government places a greater weight on producer
surplus in its import-competing industry.10 Formally, let ￿ 2 [1;7=4] denote the weight placed
by the government of the home country on the producer surplus enjoyed by its import-competing
industry. We may now de￿ne the welfare experienced by the government of the home country on
9Following Bagwell and Staiger (2001, 2005), we can derive these supply functions from underlying production
functions, in which labor is the only input and the home (foreign) country has a higher marginal product of labor
for good y (x). As usual, the partial-equilibrium model can be reinterpreted as a general-equilibrium model in which
there is an additional traded numeraire good in the background, where consumers possess quasi-linear preferences
and the numeraire good is consumed in each country and produced under constant returns from labor.
10Grossman and Helpman (1994) provide microfoundations for such government preference functions.





D(Px)dPx + ￿￿x(b Px) + [b Px ￿ Pw
x ]Mx(b Px):








The total welfare enjoyed by the government of the home country is then Wx(b Px;Pw
x ) + Wy(Pw
y ):
The welfare for the government of the foreign country is de￿ned in an analogous fashion. Let
￿￿ 2 [1;7=4] denote the weight placed by the government of the foreign country on the producer
surplus in its import-competing industry. The welfares that the government of the foreign country


































Recalling that local and world prices are determined by tari⁄s, we observe that government
welfares are ultimately functions of tari⁄s. The home-country tari⁄, ￿, a⁄ects the home-country
government￿ s welfare on its import good, Wx, and the foreign-country government￿ s welfare on its
export good, W￿
x. Thus, we may characterize the Nash and e¢ cient choices of ￿ with reference
only to Wx and W￿
x. Given the symmetry of the model, we henceforth focus on good x. We also
observe that only the home-country political-economy parameter, ￿, in￿ uences the determination
of the Nash and e¢ cient choices for ￿:
In the analysis that follows, it is sometimes convenient to have explicit expressions for Wx and
W￿






















where our notation henceforth directly re￿ ects the dependence of welfares on tari⁄s.
62.2 Nash and E¢ cient Tari⁄s
We now characterize the Nash and e¢ cient tari⁄s. We start with the Nash tari⁄. The optimal
unilateral tari⁄ for the government of the home country maximizes Wx(￿;￿): Using (1), we ￿nd





For all ￿ 2 [1;7=4], the second-order condition holds; furthermore, ￿N is non-prohibitive for all
￿ 2 [1;7=4); and ￿N reaches the prohibitive level of 1=6 when ￿ = 7=4: Using (3), we may con￿rm
that ￿N(￿) is strictly increasing in ￿: Intuitively, a higher tari⁄ is more attractive to a government
that values more heavily the producer surplus enjoyed in the import-competing industry. The case
in which the government of the home country maximizes national welfare is captured when ￿ = 1.
The home-country tari⁄also induces a negative externality on the welfare of the foreign govern-
ment. Using (2), we may con￿rm that W￿
x(￿) is strictly decreasing in ￿ = ￿N(￿) over ￿ 2 [1;7=4):
Intuitively, when the government of the home country raises its import tari⁄, the world price of
the foreign country￿ s export good is reduced. This terms-of-trade externality reduces the producer
surplus of foreign exporters. Hence, the government of the foreign country is strictly harmed by an
increase in the home-country tari⁄, so long as the foreign country is exporting a positive volume
(i.e., provided ￿ < 1=6). Due to this negative externality, Nash tari⁄s are ine¢ cient, when e¢ ciency
is measured relative to the joint welfare of the home and foreign governments.
In our partial-equilibrium setting, the e¢ cient tari⁄ for the home government is the tari⁄ that
maximizes joint welfare on the imported good. Formally, for a given political-economy parameter
￿, the e¢ cient tari⁄ maximizes J(￿;￿) ￿ Wx(￿;￿) + W￿
x(￿). Using (1) and (2), we ￿nd that the





For all ￿ 2 [1;7=4]; the second-order condition is satis￿ed. Notice that the e¢ cient tari⁄ is free
trade when the home-country government maximizes national welfare (i.e., when ￿ = 1).
The Nash and e¢ cient tari⁄s are compared in Figure 1. As illustrated there, for all ￿ 2 [1;7=4);
we may use (3) and (4) to ￿nd that ￿N(￿) > ￿E(￿): Intuitively, the Nash tari⁄ exceeds the e¢ cient
tari⁄, since only the latter re￿ ects a concern with the negative externality that ￿ ows from the
home-country tari⁄ to foreign-country welfare. As ￿ rises, the Nash tari⁄ rises and the Nash trade
volume thus falls. The reduced trade volume in turn implies a diminished role for the terms-of-trade
externality; consequently, the di⁄erence between ￿N(￿) and ￿E(￿) falls as ￿ rises. At ￿ = 7=4, the
Nash and e¢ cient tari⁄s agree, as both then equal 1=6 and thus prohibit all trade. In the analysis
below, we assume that the political-economy parameter is either low (￿ = L) or high (￿ = H). To
focus attention on political-economy pressures that are never so severe as to result in a prohibition
of trade, we assume that 1 ￿ L < H < 7=4:
72.3 Incentive-Compatible Tari⁄s
The political-economy parameters, ￿ and ￿￿, are drawn independently from a common distribution.
For any government, the probability that the political-economy parameter takes value L is denoted
as ￿L where ￿L 2 (0;1). Likewise, the probability that the political-economy parameter takes value
H is ￿H ￿ 1 ￿ ￿L 2 (0;1). Each government privately observes its own realized political-economy
parameter. Below, we often refer to a government￿ s parameter as its ￿type.￿
When governments have private information, some applied tari⁄ schedules fail to be incentive
compatible. For example, governments might seek to implement the e¢ cient tari⁄ schedule under
which a government applies the tari⁄ that is e¢ cient given its type. Under this arrangement, the
government of the home country is expected to apply the tari⁄ ￿E(H) when its type is H and the
tari⁄ ￿E(L) when its type is L: It may be, though, that ￿E(H) is closer to ￿N(L) than is ￿E(L);
so that Wx(￿E(H);L) > Wx(￿E(L);L). If this is the case, then the home-country government
may ￿lie￿and behave as if it has a high type when in fact it has a low type. Intuitively, since
the e¢ cient tari⁄ is higher when the home-country government has a high type, this government
may be tempted to lie and report a high type as it can then apply a higher tari⁄ and enjoy the
consequent terms-of-trade gain.
We next de￿ne the incentive-compatibility constraint for the static model. To this end, it is
useful ￿rst to de￿ne G(￿) ￿ 9
98 ￿ 5
49￿ ￿ 34
49￿2 and f(￿) ￿ 4
49 + 8
49￿ + 4
49￿2. Note that f(￿) > 0 and
f0(￿) > 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1=6]. Using (1), we see that Wx(￿;￿) = G(￿) + ￿f(￿): Suppose now that
governments seek to implement an applied tari⁄schedule, ￿(￿). Given this schedule, we may de￿ne
the home-country government welfare for good x that is enjoyed when this government￿ s actual
type is ￿ and it applies the tari⁄, ￿(b ￿), that is intended for type b ￿:
f Wx(b ￿;￿) ￿ G(￿(b ￿)) + ￿f(￿(b ￿)): (5)
The applied tari⁄ schedule ￿(￿) is incentive compatible if and only if, for all ￿ 2 fL;Hg and
b ￿ 2 fL;Hg,
f Wx(￿;￿) ￿ f Wx(b ￿;￿): (6)
By standard arguments, ￿(￿) is incentive compatible only if it is nondecreasing.
3 Static Model: Analysis
In this section, we analyze the static model. We distinguish between two kinds of bounds on applied
tari⁄s. In an agreement with strong bindings, a government must apply a tari⁄ that equals the
bound rate; whereas, in an agreement with weak bindings, a government can apply any tari⁄ that
does not exceed the bound rate. We characterize the optimal strong and weak bindings, and we
compare expected government welfare under these bindings with the expected welfare achieved
under Nash tari⁄s. We also characterize the most e¢ cient tari⁄s that are incentive compatible.
83.1 Optimal Strong Bindings
Under an agreement with a strong binding, each government agrees to set its applied tari⁄precisely
at the bound rate, regardless of the political pressure that it faces. Due to the terms-of-trade
externality, Nash tari⁄s are higher than is e¢ cient, and a strong binding can o⁄er the bene￿t of
preventing high tari⁄s. A strong binding also has a potential cost, however, in that it eliminates a
government￿ s ability to exercise discretion and set its applied tari⁄at a rate that re￿ ects its political
situation. An interesting issue is thus whether an agreement with a strong binding can always be
found which o⁄ers greater expected welfare to governments than they would be able to achieve in
the absence of an agreement.
Let ￿S denote a strong binding. In an agreement with a strong binding, the induced applied
tari⁄ schedule is ￿(￿) ￿ ￿S. If governments negotiate an agreement with a strong binding, then
they may seek the strong binding that maximizes joint expected welfare. We thus de￿ne an optimal
strong binding, ￿S
A, as the solution to the following program:
max
￿S EJ(￿S;￿);
where E is the expectation operation taken with respect to ￿. We do not include here an incentive-
compatibility constraint, since the applied tari⁄s induced by a strong binding do not vary with type
and thus are trivially incentive compatible. Given that Wx(￿;￿) is linear in ￿, the optimal strong
binding must maximize J(￿S;E￿), where E￿ ￿ ￿LL + ￿HH. Using (4), we thus conclude that
￿S




In short, the optimal strong binding is the e¢ cient tari⁄ for the expected type.
We seek to compare expected joint welfare when governments reach an agreement to use the
optimal strong binding with the expected joint welfare when governments have no agreement and
thus apply Nash tari⁄s. For a given good, it is clear that the expected welfare for the government
of the importing country (i.e., EWx) is higher when it is allowed to apply Nash tari⁄s. It is more
interesting to consider expected welfare for the government of the exporting country (i.e., EW￿
x).
As suggested above, it reasonable to anticipate that an agreement to use the optimal strong binding
would lower the expected applied tari⁄. Such an agreement would also reduce the variance in the
applied tari⁄. Since the welfare of the government of the exporting country is decreasing and convex
in the applied tari⁄, it is not immediately clear whether an agreement to use the optimal strong
binding would increase the expected welfare of the exporting country.
Despite these con￿ icting considerations, we are able to report the following:
Proposition 1: (i) The expected Nash tari⁄ is strictly higher than the optimal strong binding:
E￿N(￿) > ￿S
A: (ii) Expected welfare for the government of the exporting country is strictly higher





9Thus, for a given good, the government of the exporting country strictly prefers the applied tari⁄
induced by the optimal strong binding to the applied Nash tari⁄s, while the government of the
importing country has the opposite preference. The proof is found in the Appendix.
We next analyze the e⁄ect of an agreement to use the optimal strong binding on expected
joint welfare. Before undertaking this analysis, however, we impose a parameter restriction that
is maintained throughout the remainder of the paper. In particular, we assume that the optimal
strong binding exceeds the Nash tari⁄when the type is low: ￿S
A = ￿E(E￿) > ￿N(L). As we con￿rm
below, when this inequality holds, the optimal weak and strong bindings induce di⁄erent applied
tari⁄s, and the optimal weak binding is such that a government with a low type applies a tari⁄
that is strictly below the bound level. Using (3) and (7), we may restate the desired inequality in
terms of the following restriction on parameters: E￿ > (8L + 7)=12:
Consider now Figure 1. As shown there, the optimal strong binding induces an applied tari⁄
that is higher (lower) than would be e¢ cient when the type is low (high). Given our parameter
restriction, the optimal strong binding induces an applied tari⁄ that is higher than the applied
Nash tari⁄ when the type is low. Thus, in the event that the government of the importing country
has a low type, the optimal strong binding is less e¢ cient than is the corresponding Nash tari⁄.
By contrast, in the event that the type is high, the e¢ cient tari⁄ is below the corresponding Nash
tari⁄ and above the applied tari⁄ that is induced by the optimal strong binding. A trade-o⁄ may
thus arise across the two events, since the optimal strong binding may be more e¢ cient than the
Nash tari⁄ when the type is high.
Looking at Figure 1, however, we may anticipate one circumstance in which a trade-o⁄ across
events fails to arise. In particular, suppose that the di⁄erence in types is large, so that H is near
7=4 while L is well below this bound. The di⁄erence between ￿N(H) and ￿E(H) is then small, and
so the Nash tari⁄ is approximately e¢ cient when the type is high. The optimal strong binding,
however, equals ￿E(E￿) and thus remains below ￿E(H), with the gap being larger when ￿H is
smaller. Thus, when H ￿ L is large in this sense and ￿H is not too high, we anticipate that joint
welfare is higher when Nash tari⁄s are applied than when an agreement to use the optimal strong
binding is reached, whether the importing government￿ s type is low or high. If this reasoning is
correct, then circumstances exist under which an agreement to use a strong binding cannot improve
upon the no-agreement benchmark in which Nash tari⁄s are applied.
We introduce a proposition below that con￿rms this reasoning and o⁄ers further comparisons.
To state the proposition, we require a few de￿nitions. Consider ￿rst our parameter restriction




implies ￿H > 1=3: In fact, our restriction can be restated in equivalent form as the requirements
that ￿H > 1=3 and
L(H;￿H) ￿ (3￿HH ￿ 7=4)=(3￿H ￿ 1) > L: (8)
For a ￿xed ￿H > 1=3, and given H < 7=4, we see that L(H;￿H) is strictly increasing in H and ￿H
and that L(H;￿H) < H. It is also convenient to note that L(7=4;￿H) ￿ 7=4.
Second, we set J(￿N(L);H) = J(￿N(H);H) and thereby implicitly de￿ne the function L =
10LN(H). This function de￿nes the combinations of L and H such that joint welfare when the
government of the importing country has a high type is the same whether the high or low Nash
tari⁄is applied. Put di⁄erently, this function describes combinations of L and H such that ￿E(H) =
(￿N(H) + ￿N(L))=2. We ￿nd that
LN(H) = (143H ￿ 119 ￿ 12H2)=(61 ￿ 4H): (9)
Using (8) and (9), calculations con￿rm the following relationships: LN(H) is strictly increasing in
H, LN(7=4) = 7=4, and L(H;1) > LN(H) > L(H;1=3 + ") for " > 0 and su¢ ciently small. We
note as well that
signfJ(￿N(L);H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H)g = signfL ￿ LN(H)g: (10)
The relationship between L(H;￿H) and LN(H) is depicted in Figure 2.
We are now ready to state our second proposition. The proposition concerns ￿ ￿ EJ(￿S
A;￿)￿
EJ(￿N(￿);￿), which is the di⁄erence in the expected joint welfare achieved under an agreement to
use the optimal strong binding and that achieved in the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2: (i) Suppose H ￿L is small in the sense that L(H;1) > L > LN(H). There exists
e ￿H 2 (1=3;1) such that for all ￿H 2 (e ￿H;1), ￿S
A > ￿N(L) and ￿ > 0: (ii) Suppose H ￿ L is large
in the sense that LN(H) > L. There exists e ￿H 2 (1=3;1) and b ￿H 2 (e ￿H;1) such that (a) for all
￿H 2 (e ￿H;1), ￿S
A > ￿N(L), (b) for all ￿H 2 (e ￿H;b ￿H), ￿ < 0, and (c) for all ￿H 2 (b ￿H;1), ￿ > 0.
The proof of this proposition is found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 may be understood with reference to Figure 2. Part (i) of the proposition applies
when L and H reside in region A. For a particular point x = (H;L) in this region, there exists a
critical value e ￿H 2 (1=3;1) such that L = L(H;e ￿H). In the ￿gure, the parameter value e ￿H generates
the dotted line that passes through x. For any ￿H 2 (e ￿H;1), the point x lies below L(H;￿H). Our
parameter restriction then holds and thus ￿S
A > ￿N(L): Part (i) of the proposition indicates that
the optimal strong binding then generates strictly higher expected welfare than occurs in the Nash
equilibrium. Intuitively, when H￿L is small, the volume of trade is large even when the government
of the importing country has a high type and sets its Nash tari⁄. The presence of a large trade
volume in turn implies that the terms-of-trade externality plays an important role, with the result
being a large di⁄erence between the Nash and e¢ cient tari⁄s in the high-type state.
Part (ii) of the proposition concerns region B. For a particular point y = (H;L) in this region,
we may again ￿nd e ￿H 2 (1=3;1) such that L = L(H;e ￿H). For ￿H slightly above this value, ￿S
A
is only slightly above ￿N(L). Joint welfare is then approximately the same in the low-type state
whether governments have an agreement or not. In this region, however, the volume of trade is low
when the government has a high type and applies its Nash tari⁄. Accordingly, the terms-of-trade
externality then plays a small role, and so the Nash tari⁄ is close to e¢ cient in the high-type state.
Expected joint welfare is then strictly higher for governments when they have no agreement and
11thus apply their Nash tari⁄s. Finally, for higher values of ￿H, an agreement to use the optimal
strong binding generates strictly higher expected joint welfare. To see this, note that when ￿H ￿ 1,
so that the government of the importing country almost always has a high type, the optimal strong
binding induces an applied tari⁄ that is approximately equal to ￿E(H). An agreement to use the
optimal strong binding then induces an applied tari⁄ that is almost always approximately e¢ cient.
In general, when governments are privately informed as to their political pressures, a trade
agreement has two roles to serve. First, it should reduce the average tari⁄ and thereby undo
the ine¢ ciency that is attributable to the terms-of-trade externality. Second, it should provide
su¢ cient ￿ exibility that governments can adjust their tari⁄s to their political circumstances. An
agreement to use an optimal strong binding addresses the ￿rst role and neglects the second. As
Proposition 2 indicates, in some cases, such an agreement generates lower expected joint welfare
for governments than they achieve in the absence of any agreement. Proposition 2 thus provides
motivation to consider alternative forms for agreements, in which the average tari⁄ is lowered and
yet governments are also able to exercise some discretion in an incentive-compatible way. We thus
next consider an agreement to use a weak binding.
3.2 Optimal Weak Bindings
We consider now an agreement to use a weak binding. With such an agreement, governments
place an upper bound on the permissible level of an applied tari⁄, and at the same time provide
downward discretion so that a government can apply a tari⁄ below the binding if it so chooses. An
agreement with a weak binding thus o⁄ers scope for lowering the average tari⁄ from the Nash level
while also providing downward ￿ exibility.
Let ￿W denote a weak binding. In an agreement with a weak binding, the induced applied tari⁄
schedule is ￿(￿) = minf￿W;￿N(￿)g. Intuitively, a government applies a tari⁄ below the bound
rate, if its optimal tari⁄ is below the bound rate. Otherwise, the government applies a tari⁄ equal
to the bound rate, as it thereby applies a tari⁄ that is as close to its optimal rate as possible.
When governments negotiate an agreement with a weak binding, they may select the weak binding
that maximizes expected joint welfare. Accordingly, we de￿ne an optimal weak binding, ￿W
A , as the
solution to the following program:
max
￿W EJ(minf￿W;￿N(￿)g;￿):
It is not necessary to include an incentive compatibility constraint, since this constraint is auto-
matically satis￿ed: a weak binding precludes (places no restrictions on) the application of a tari⁄
above (below) the bound rate.
Consider now various candidates for ￿W. First, if ￿W ￿ ￿N(H), then a government would set
its import tari⁄ at ￿N(H) when its type is high and at ￿N(L) when its type is low. Thus, a weak
binding in this range simply induces the application of Nash tari⁄s. We may conclude that, when
governments agree on the optimal weak binding, their expected joint welfare cannot be lower than
12that which they achieve under Nash tari⁄s. Second, at the other extreme, if ￿W ￿ ￿N(L), then
governments would always apply a tari⁄ that is equal to the weak binding. In this case, the weak
binding performs like a strong binding. Under our parameter restriction, as argued above, the
optimal strong binding is ￿S
A = ￿E(E￿) > ￿N(L): Given that expected joint welfare is concave in
the applied tari⁄, it follows that the optimal weak binding must satisfy ￿W
A ￿ ￿N(L).
The third possibility is that ￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)). Suppose for example that the weak binding
is set at the level of the optimal strong binding: ￿W = ￿S
A. Given that ￿N(H) > ￿S
A > ￿N(L), if
this weak binding is used and a government has a high type, then it would apply a tari⁄ equal to
the binding. This weak binding thus induces the same applied tari⁄ for a high type as does the
optimal strong binding. Now consider a government with a low type. Since the binding is weak,
this government would venture below the binding and apply its optimal tari⁄, ￿N(L). Notice, too,
that joint welfare is then strictly increased, since ￿N(L) is closer to ￿E(L) than is ￿S
A. Since a weak
binding with ￿W = ￿S
A thus generates strictly higher expected welfare than does the optimal strong
binding, we conclude that governments are sure to achieve strictly higher expected joint welfare
when they agree on an optimal weak binding than when they agree on an optimal strong binding.
Intuitively, a weak binding can bound the maximal tari⁄just as e⁄ectively as does a strong binding;
however, a weak binding o⁄ers the further advantage of e¢ ciency-enhancing downward discretion.
Our next task is to determine the optimal weak binding. We establish above that ￿W
A ￿ ￿N(L).
For any ￿W ￿ ￿N(L), a government with a low type applies its optimal tari⁄, ￿N(L). Thus, an
optimal weak binding only a⁄ects the tari⁄ that is applied by a government with a high type.
Consequently, the optimal weak binding is set at the e¢ cient tari⁄ for a government with a high
type: ￿W
A = ￿E(H):
Observe that the optimal weak binding is strictly higher than the optimal strong binding:
￿W
A = ￿E(H) > ￿E(E￿) = ￿S
A. Intuitively, the optimal strong binding induces an applied tari⁄
that is below the level that would be e¢ cient when the government has a high type, since under
a strong binding the applied tari⁄ for a high type cannot be increased without increasing, too,
the applied tari⁄ for a low type. With a weak binding, governments have more ￿ exibility, and
it becomes possible to induce a higher and more e¢ cient tari⁄ for the high type of government
without altering the tari⁄ that a low type would apply.
We can summarize our results to this point with the following proposition.
Proposition 3: When governments reach an agreement to use an optimal weak binding, they enjoy
expected joint welfare that is strictly higher than that which they would achieve in an agreement to
use an optimal strong binding and than that which they would achieve if Nash tari⁄s were applied.
The optimal weak binding is strictly higher than the optimal strong binding. When governments
agree to use the optimal weak binding, a government with a low level of political pressure applies
its optimal tari⁄, and this tari⁄ is strictly below the bound rate.
This result provides one interpretation for the observation that governments often apply tari⁄s that
are below the weak bound rates to which they agree in GATT/WTO negotiations. Bagwell and
13Staiger (2005) report a similar result in a model with a continuum of types. The two-type model
considered here allows for a simple proof of the result. As we show below, in the two-type setting,
we can also report new results about the magnitude of expected applied tari⁄s. Finally, Proposition
3 also leads to the prediction that a government￿ s applied tari⁄ should be higher when the export
supply function is less elastic, in the event that the applied tari⁄ is below the bound rate. This
follows since the applied tari⁄ is then an optimal tari⁄ (given the government￿ s preferences).11
Proposition 3 establishes that the optimal weak binding exceeds the optimal strong binding. An
interesting question is whether the applied tari⁄s that are induced by the respective bindings can
be similarly ranked. We next show that, given our parameter restriction, the optimal weak binding
induces a strictly higher expected applied tari⁄ than does the optimal strong binding.12 This is
perhaps somewhat surprising, since the traditional terms-of-trade reasoning suggests that expected
joint welfare gains are achieved through reductions in tari⁄s. Intuitively, when governments use a
strong binding, they are unable to customize their applied tari⁄s to their political circumstances;
hence, they simply focus on reducing the average applied tari⁄. When weak bindings are used,
however, governments have some ￿ exibility, and they are able to raise the applied tari⁄ to a more
e¢ cient level when political pressures are high.
Proposition 4: The expected Nash tari⁄ is strictly higher than the expected applied tari⁄ when
governments agree to use the optimal weak binding, and the expected applied tari⁄ when governments
agree to use the optimal weak binding is strictly higher than the optimal strong binding.
The proof is found in the Appendix.
3.3 Second-Best Tari⁄s
In this subsection, we consider all of the applied tari⁄schedules that are incentive compatible when
transfers are not feasible. Our analysis thus includes the applied tari⁄s that are induced by strong
and weak bindings; however, we no longer require that the applied tari⁄ schedule can be induced
by a strong or weak binding. Our ￿ndings in this subsection thus provide a benchmark against
which an agreement with strong or weak bindings might be compared.
Let ￿(￿) denote an incentive-compatible applied tari⁄schedule. We de￿ne the second-best tari⁄s
as the applied tari⁄ schedule, ￿SB(￿), that solves the following second-best program:
max
￿(￿)
EJ(￿(￿);￿) s.t. ￿(￿) satis￿es (6).
We observe above that an applied tari⁄ schedule is incentive compatible only if it is nondecreasing.
Our goal now is to characterize the second-best tari⁄s.
11See Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008) for an examination of the empirical relationship between export supply
elasticities and the import tari⁄s applied by governments prior to accession in the WTO.
12Without our parameter restriction, it is possible that the optimal weak and strong bindings would be set at a
common level below ￿
N(L) and thus induce the same applied tari⁄.
14We distinguish between two cases. In the ￿rst case, we have that
Wx(￿E(L);L) ￿ Wx(￿E(H);L): (11)
When this ￿rst case holds, the second-best tari⁄s are in fact ￿rst best. In other words, when this
case holds, the e¢ cient tari⁄schedule, ￿E(￿), satis￿es (6) and thus solves the second-best program.
To con￿rm that ￿E(￿) satis￿es (6), we simply note that a government with a low type prefers
applying ￿E(L) to ￿E(H) under (11). Further, a government with a high type prefers applying
￿E(H) to ￿E(L), since ￿E(H) is closer to this government￿ s optimal tari⁄.
We ￿nd that (11) holds if and only if (￿E(H) + ￿E(L))=2 ￿ ￿N(L), so that ￿E(L) is closer to
￿N(L) than is ￿E(H). In turn, this inequality holds if and L and H are such that H ￿ HFB(L) ￿
(9L￿4L2 + 175
4 )=(41￿8L). Let LFB(H) denote the inverse of HFB(L), for the values that L and
H may take in our model. Then (11) holds if and only if LFB(H) ￿ L, where LFB(65=44) = 1 and
LFB(H) is strictly increasing and convex in H for H 2 [65=44;7=4). We note that LFB(7=4) = 7=4.
As shown in Figure 3, LFB(H) lies strictly below L(H;1) and strictly above L(H;1=2): The region
for which our ￿rst case holds is the set of L and H that lie on or to the southeast of LFB(H).
Over this region, the di⁄erence between H and L is relatively large. We note as well that, if
￿H 2 (1=3;1=2], then our parameter restriction implies that (11) holds.
We summarize our ￿ndings with respect to the ￿rst case as follows:
Proposition 5: When (11) holds, the e¢ cient tari⁄s are incentive compatible, and thus ￿SB(￿) =
￿E(￿). In turn, (11) holds if H ￿ L is large, in the sense that L and H lie on or to the southeast
of LFB(H): Under our parameter restriction, if ￿H 2 (1=3;1=2], then (11) must hold.
Thus, in our two-type model, if the types are far apart, e¢ cient tari⁄s are incentive compatible.
Recall that the optimal weak binding does not induce the application of the e¢ cient tari⁄s. It is
instructive to review the logic behind this ￿nding. If a weak binding were to induce the application
of e¢ cient tari⁄s, the bound rate would need to be at least ￿E(H). Given that ￿E(H) > ￿E(E￿) >
￿N(L) under our parameter restriction, it would then follow that the bound rate strictly exceeds
￿N(L). But then a government with a low type would apply ￿N(L) rather than ￿E(L). Hence,
it is impossible to induce the application of e¢ cient tari⁄s by using a weak binding.13 While the
applied tari⁄s induced by the optimal weak binding are more e¢ cient than those induced by the
optimal strong binding and than the Nash tari⁄s, they do not achieve full e¢ ciency.
The second case holds when (11) fails. Thus, in the second case,
Wx(￿E(L);L) < Wx(￿E(H);L): (12)
In terms of Figure 3, the region for which (12) holds is the set of L and H that lie to the northwest
13In fact, whether or not our parameter restriction holds, it is impossible to induce the application of e¢ cient tari⁄s
using a weak binding. Given ￿
E(H) < ￿
N(H), a government with the high type applies ￿
E(H) only if the weak
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15of LFB(H). Clearly, e¢ cient tari⁄s fail to be incentive compatible in this case: a government with
a low type would ￿lie￿and pretend to have a high type. In this second case, the second-best tari⁄s
must involve a distortion from the e¢ cient tari⁄s, for at least one or possibly both types.
To better understand this second case, we suppose initially that governments apply the tari⁄s,
￿(H) = ￿E(H) and ￿(L) = ￿N(L), that are induced by the optimal weak binding. A government
with a low type then strictly prefers to select the low-type rather than the high-type tari⁄. We
may thus engineer a strictly higher level of expected joint welfare by lowering the low-type tari⁄
to the critical level at which a government with a low type is indi⁄erent to ￿lying￿and selecting
the high-type tari⁄. Under (12), the critical low-type tari⁄ falls strictly between ￿E(L) and ￿N(L).
At this point, we may engineer a further strict improvement by raising the high-type tari⁄ to a
level that is slightly above ￿E(H). This small change in the high-type tari⁄ itself has no ￿rst-order
e⁄ect on expected joint welfare; however, it reduces the gain to lying and thereby faciliates a strict
improvement by enabling a further reduction in the low-type tari⁄toward ￿E(L). We may continue
in this fashion, raising the high-type tari⁄ above ￿E(H) and lowering the low-type tari⁄ toward
￿E(L); until an optimal balance is achieved. We note, though, that it would not be optimal to
push the low-type tari⁄ all the way down to ￿E(L), since the ￿rst-order bene￿t of a low-type tari⁄
reduction approaches zero as the tari⁄ approaches ￿E(L).
We generalize this argument in the Appendix and establish the following proposition:
Proposition 6: When (12) holds, ￿SB(￿) satis￿es ￿E(L) < ￿SB(L) < ￿N(L) and ￿E(H) <
￿SB(H). In turn, (12) holds if H￿L is small, in the sense that L and H lie on or to the northwest
of LFB(H): There exists values for L and H that satisfy (12) and our parameter restriction, if
￿H is su¢ ciently large.
We also con￿rm in the Appendix the stated relationships between (12) and the model parameters.
It is interesting to compare the second-best tari⁄s characterized in Proposition 6 with the
applied tari⁄s induced by the optimal weak binding. We make two observations. First, like the
e¢ cient tari⁄s, the second-best tari⁄s characterized in Proposition 6 cannot be induced through an
agreement to use a weak (or strong) binding. Instead, an agreement that implements the second-
best tari⁄s would allow two particular tari⁄s, ￿(L) and ￿(H), and regard any other selection as
a violation. An agreement of this kind requires careful calibration and monitoring; thus, it is
perhaps understandable that this form of agreement is not descriptive of actual GATT/WTO tari⁄
agreements. Nevertheless, it is instructive to understand the form that an optimal agreement
takes, if governments possess private information and are otherwise free from transaction costs.
Second, the second-best tari⁄s entail a wider spread than do the applied tari⁄s induced by the
optimal weak binding; in particular, under the second-best tari⁄ schedule, the lowest tari⁄ is lower
(￿SB(L) < ￿N(L)) and the highest tari⁄ is higher (￿SB(H) > ￿E(H)).
It is also interesting to compare the second-best tari⁄s characterized in Proposition 6 with the
e¢ cient tari⁄s. Notice that the second-best tari⁄s entail distortions at the bottom and at the top:
the low type of government applies a tari⁄ that is above the e¢ cient level (￿SB(L) > ￿E(L)), and
16the high type of government also applies a tari⁄that exceeds the e¢ cient level (￿SB(H) > ￿E(H)).
This ￿nding contrasts with the usual ￿no-distortion-at-the-top￿￿nding that obtains in a standard
Principal-Agent problem, in which a Principal maximizes its objective and provides a menu of
choices to a privately informed Agent. The problem we analyze here is di⁄erent in two respects.
First, we do not have a Principal; instead, we maximize Agents￿expected joint welfare and provide
a menu of choices to privately informed Agents. Second, unlike the standard Principal-Agent
problem, our analysis does not allow for transfers. The absence of transfers makes the second-best
program more challenging to analyze. When transfers are allowed, governments can design a trade
agreement in which they achieve e¢ cient tari⁄s.
Our analysis is also related to recent work on repeated games with private information by Athey,
Atkeson and Kehoe (2005), Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008) and Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico
(2004). In the stage games used in this work, one player￿ s expected welfare is a⁄ected by the
actions of another player through the probability that the latter player￿ s action is higher than
the former player￿ s action or through the mean action level of the latter player. Correspondingly,
under appropriate distributional assumptions, the second-best schedule for the Agents involves rigid
behavior (i.e., a strong binding) or downward discretion with a cap (i.e., a weak binding). The trade
application considered here has a novel payo⁄ structure, in that government welfare functions take
a separable form and are quadratic in tari⁄s. As (2) con￿rms, one government￿ s welfare is a⁄ected
by the mean and variance of the other government￿ s tari⁄. Working with a two-type model, we
o⁄er in Proposition 6 a simple characterization of the second-best tari⁄s for this linear-quadratic
setting. Interestingly, the second-best tari⁄s cannot be achieved with a strong or weak binding.
4 Enforcement: Transitory Shocks
In the previous section, we analyze a static model and simply assume that any agreement can be
enforced. In fact, trade agreements must be self-enforcing. In the remainder of paper, we therefore
focus on dynamic models. This enables us to formalize the idea that a government will honor its
commitments under a trade agreement, if it perceives that the short-term bene￿t of ￿cheating￿is
less than the long-term cost of the ensuing retaliatory measures that its trading partner would then
adopt. We thus characterize self-enforcing trade agreements as equilibria of a repeated or dynamic
game with private information.
In the sections that follow, we assume that governments seek to establish a ￿simple￿ trade
agreement in which they negotiate bound tari⁄rates. In much of our analysis, we consider whether
governments can enforce a trade agreement in which they apply the tari⁄s that are induced by the
optimal weak binding. Throughout our analysis, in the event that a government cheats and applies
a tari⁄ in excess of the bound rate, we assume that governments abandon cooperation and apply
Nash tari⁄s thereafter. Of course, more sophisticated (e.g., carrot-stick) punishment schemes could
be entertained as well; however, if governments require an explicit agreement in order to coordinate
on a cooperative path, it is perhaps unlikely that a breakdown in cooperation would be consistent
17with the coordination of a sophisticated punishment path.14
In the present section, we begin our formal analysis with a model in which each government￿ s
privately observed political-economy parameter (i.e., its type) is independently determined over
time. In subsequent sections, we build on this foundation and allow that the privately observed
types are perfectly and imperfectly persistent through time.
4.1 The Repeated Game with Transitory Shocks
The repeated game with transitory shocks is informally described as follows. In each period, each
government privately observes its type, where types are identically and independently distributed
across governments and over time. The governments then simultaneously apply their tari⁄s, and
government welfare for the period is determined. Applied tari⁄s are publicly observed. Thus,
at the start of any period t, each government observes a private history and a public history. A
government￿ s private history includes its knowledge of its current and past types. The public history
that governments share is their common observation of the tari⁄s applied by both governments in all
preceding periods. The same sequence repeats in each of an in￿nite number of periods, t = 1;:::;1.
We consider the perfect public equilibria (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin, 1994) of this game.
Hence, we require that each government uses a public strategy: the tari⁄ that a government applies
in period t may depend on the public history of applied tari⁄s and on this government￿ s private
observation of its current type; however, a government￿ s applied tari⁄ in period t may not depend
upon payo⁄-irrelevant private information, such as its private recollection of its types in previous
periods. We also restrict attention to symmetric perfect public equilibria, which we de￿ne as perfect
public equilibria in which governments use ex ante symmetric strategies. Thus, in a symmetric
perfect public equilibrium, strategies are exchangeable across governments as a function of public
histories and current types and do not depend on governments￿￿names.￿In this section, we refer
to symmetric perfect public equilibria as equilibria.
In repeated games with private information, a player may consider two kinds of deviations.15
A ￿rst kind of deviation is known as an on-schedule deviation. A deviation of this kind occurs
when a government has type ￿ 2 fL;Hg in some period t and deviates by applying the tari⁄ that
is intended for type ￿0 2 fL;Hg, where ￿0 6= ￿ and the equilibrium tari⁄s for L and H in period t
are distinct. An on-schedule deviation by one government is not observable, as a deviation, to the
other government. The second kind of deviation is called an o⁄-schedule deviation. A deviation of
this kind occurs in period t if a government applies a tari⁄that is not prescribed by the equilibrium
for either of the two possible types of governments. An o⁄-schedule deviation by one government is
14Following Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Chapter 6; 2005), we regard retaliation provisions in the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding as facilitating on-equilibrium-path rebalancing of tari⁄s in response to political-economic
shocks. By contrast, the Nash reversion that follows an o⁄-equilibrium-path deviation captures the understanding
among governments that non-compliant behavior could lead to a breakdown in the cooperative endeavor. In the
two-type model considered here, the scope for rebalancing provisions is limited. See Bagwell and Staiger (2005) for
a model with a continuum of types in which WTO escape clause rules can be interpreted as on-equilibrium-path
responses to political-economic shocks.
15Our discussion here follows Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004).
18observable, as a deviation, to the other government. In the event of an o⁄-schedule deviation, play
has moved o⁄ of the equilibrium path, and governments may then move into a punishment phase.
We assume that governments negotiate a trade agreement at date zero, before learning their
￿rst-period types. In the present section, we assume further that the agreement takes the form of a
weak binding. The associated applied tari⁄s can be enforced in an equilibrium of the repeated game
with transitory shocks if they do not invite on-schedule or o⁄-schedule deviations. We de￿ne below
a class of ￿weak-binding equilibria￿for the repeated game, in which the applied tari⁄s induced by a
weak binding do not give rise to an on-schedule deviation. For such equilibria, the important issue
is whether governments are su¢ ciently patient to resist undertaking an o⁄-schedule deviation.
4.2 Weak-Binding Equilibria
We de￿ne a weak-binding equilibrium as an equilibrium in which there exists a weak binding ￿W
such that (i) along the equilibrium path, governments apply tari⁄s that are equal to or below
￿W, and (ii) at any period t, the applied tari⁄s selected by governments are independent of the
public history so long as no government has previously applied a tari⁄ in excess of ￿W. The ￿rst
requirement is simply a de￿nition of a weak binding. If a government applies a tari⁄ that exceeds
the bound rate, it has violated the agreement. The second requirement goes somewhat further and
posits that any applied tari⁄ at or below the bound rate is ￿￿ne,￿in the sense that the applied
tari⁄s selected in the future by one government are not sensitive to the particular way in which the
other government has met its weak-binding obligation.16
With the notion of a weak-binding equilibrium, we thus have a way to formalize the appealing
idea that an agreement to use a weak binding e⁄ectively partitions the public history of applied
tari⁄s into ￿good histories￿ (both governments have historically applied tari⁄s that satisfy the
agreed-upon weak binding) and ￿bad histories￿(at least one government has applied a tari⁄ that
violates the weak binding). In the latter event, some government has taken an o⁄-schedule deviation
in which it applied a tari⁄ in excess of ￿W, and governments then abandon cooperation and revert
to Nash tari⁄s in all future periods. Notice, though, that governments do not punish (or reward)
an o⁄-schedule deviation that involves an applied tari⁄ that is at or below the weak binding. In
any period along the equilibrium path, governments can thus choose freely over all applied tari⁄s
that satisfy the weak binding. Hence, in a weak-binding equilibrium, ￿W induces the applied tari⁄
schedule ￿(￿;￿W) = minf￿W;￿N(￿)g, where our notation now makes explicit the dependence of
the applied tari⁄ schedule on the weak binding. As noted in Section 3, the induced applied tari⁄s
satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint for the static game. We may thus conclude that the
applied tari⁄s induced by a weak-binding equilibrium do not give rise to an on-schedule deviation.
The more interesting issue is whether governments are willing to forego o⁄-schedule deviations
in which they apply tari⁄s in excess of the weak binding. In the remainder of this section, we
16In independent work, Aramendia, Ruiz and Wen (2008) propose a related solution concept for in￿nitely repeated
games. Under this concept, players continue ￿as if nothing happened when a player deviates unilaterally without
harming the others in a period.￿They consider a general family of games but do not allow for private information.
19characterize the critical discount factor above which governments can support the applied tari⁄s
induced by the optimal weak binding, ￿W
A , in a weak-binding equilibrium of the repeated game
with transitory shocks. We also characterize the ￿most-cooperative￿polices that can be enforced
in a weak-binding equilibrium when governments are less patient.
To start, we consider any weak binding, ￿W, and characterize the short-term incentive to cheat
and the long-term discounted cost of a breakdown in cooperation, respectively. We de￿ne the
short-term gain from cheating from an applied tari⁄ ￿ for a government with type ￿ as
￿(￿;￿) ￿ Wx(￿N(￿);￿) ￿ Wx(￿;￿): (13)
Notice that ￿(￿;￿) is strictly convex in ￿ and reaches a minimum of zero when ￿ = ￿N(￿).
Consider now how the incentive to cheat varies with the weak binding, ￿W, for a government with
type ￿. If governments use a weak binding, ￿W, the induced applied tari⁄ schedule is ￿(￿;￿W) =
minf￿W;￿N(￿)g. Thus, a government with type ￿ would evaluate the potential bene￿ts of cheating
from the applied tari⁄ ￿(￿W;￿):
￿(￿(￿;￿W);￿) ￿ Wx(￿N(￿);￿) ￿ Wx(￿(￿;￿W);￿): (14)
Observe that, if ￿W ￿ ￿N(￿), then ￿(￿;￿W) = ￿N(￿) and so ￿(￿(￿;￿W);￿) = 0. A government
has no incentive to cheat when the weak binding exceeds its Nash tari⁄, as it then already applies
its optimal tari⁄. By contrast, if ￿W < ￿N(￿), then ￿(￿;￿W) = ￿W, and an incentive to cheat thus
exists. In Figure 4a, we illustrate ￿(￿(￿;￿W);￿) as a function of ￿W. A case of special interest
occurs when the weak binding is set at its optimal level, ￿W
A = ￿E(H). The induced applied tari⁄s
are then ￿(L;￿W
A ) = ￿N(L) and ￿(H;￿W
A ) = ￿E(H); hence, we have that ￿(￿(L;￿W
A );L) = 0 and
￿(￿(H;￿W
A );H) = Wx(￿N(H);H)￿Wx(￿E(H);H) > 0. Thus, when governments agree to use the
optimal weak binding, an incentive to cheat exists only for a government with the high type.
We consider next the future value of cooperation. If cheating occurs, then in each future period
governments abandon cooperation and apply Nash tari⁄s. For the repeated game with transitory
shocks, when a weak binding ￿W is used, the per-period value of cooperation is
!(￿W) ￿ E[Wx(￿(￿;￿W);￿) ￿ Wx(￿N(￿);￿)] + E[W￿
x(￿(￿;￿W)) ￿ W￿
x(￿N(￿))]: (15)
The ￿rst term is negative and corresponds to the fact that a government gains with respect to its
import good from a breakdown in cooperation, since it then applies its optimal tari⁄regardless of its
type. The second term captures the potential loss to a government from a breakdown in cooperation:
its export good then confronts Nash tari⁄s abroad.17 The per-period value of cooperation can be
re-written as
!(￿W) ￿ E[J(￿(￿;￿W);￿) ￿ J(￿N(￿);￿)]: (16)
17Recall that the symmetric structure of our model enables us to focus on good x; since the expected welfare for
the government of the home country on good y is the same as the expected welfare for the government of the foreign
country on good x:
20This expression follows from (15) and the de￿nition of joint welfare J(￿;￿).
Consider how !(￿W) varies with ￿W. For ￿W ￿ ￿N(H), the weak binding exceeds all Nash
tari⁄s, and so the induced applied tari⁄ schedule is simply the Nash tari⁄ schedule: ￿(￿;￿W) =
￿N(￿). It follows that !(￿W) = 0 for ￿W ￿ ￿N(H). For ￿W 2 [￿N(L);￿N(H)), the induced
applied tari⁄ for the low type remains ￿N(L); however, the induced applied tari⁄ for the high type
is now ￿W. As we argue above, the optimal weak binding is thus ￿W
A = ￿E(H). Hence, for ￿W 2
[￿N(L);￿N(H)), !(￿W) is strictly concave and obtains its maximum at ￿W
A = ￿E(H), at which
point !(￿E(H)) > 0 by Proposition 3. Over this range, !(￿W) = ￿H[J(￿W;H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H)],
since the low type applies its Nash tari⁄ whether or not governments cooperate. Thus, the sign of
!(￿N(L)) is the same as the sign of J(￿N(L);H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H). Using (10), we thus have that
signf!(￿N(L))g = signfL ￿ LN(H)g: (17)
As shown in Figure 2, it follows that !(￿N(L)) > 0 if H ￿ L is su¢ ciently small. Finally, if
￿W < ￿N(L), then the induced applied tari⁄ is ￿(￿;￿W) = ￿W for ￿ = L and ￿ = H: The weak
binding is then equivalent in its e⁄ect to a strong binding. Since the optimal strong binding is
￿S
A = ￿E(E￿) > ￿N(L) under our parameter restriction, !(￿w) is strictly increasing in ￿W for
￿W < ￿N(L). The function !(￿w) is illustrated in Figure 4b for the case in which !(￿N(L)) > 0.
We may now state and analyze the o⁄-schedule incentive constraint for a weak-binding equi-
librium in the repeated game with transitory shocks. Since types are independent over time, a
government￿ s expected future discounted value of cooperation is independent of its current type.
We assume that governments discount the future using a common discount factor, ￿ 2 (0;1). Hence,





where ￿(￿(￿;￿W);￿) and !(￿W) are de￿ned in (14) and (16), respectively. The applied tari⁄s
induced by ￿W can be enforced in a weak-binding equilibrium if and only if (18) holds.
We now characterize the critical discount factor, ￿W
A ; above which governments can support a
weak-binding equilibrium in which the weak binding is set at the optimal weak binding, ￿W
A . At
this binding, a government with a low type applies its optimal tari⁄, ￿N(L), and has no incentive
to cheat. A government with a high type, by contrast, has a positive incentive to cheat. Thus, (18)
holds for the optimal weak binding, ￿W
A , if and only if ￿(￿W
A ;H) ￿ ￿
1￿￿!(￿W
A ). Given ￿W
A = ￿E(H),




Wx(￿N(H);H) ￿ Wx(￿E(H);H) + ￿H[J(￿E(H);H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H)]
: (19)
Using (19), it is easy to see that ￿W
A 2 (0;1). Thus, for su¢ ciently patient governments, an
agreement to apply the tari⁄s induced by the optimal weak binding is self enforcing, where the
21critical level of patience is given by ￿W
A :18
The critical discount factor is a function of model parameters. Using (19), we see that ￿W
A is
di⁄erentiable and strictly decreasing in ￿H. This re￿ ects the idea that the cost of a Nash trade war
is greater when the other government is expected more often to have a high type in future periods,
since the applied tari⁄ of the other government would then more often rise in future periods were
cooperation abandoned.
The determination of ￿W
A is illustrated in Figure 5. We depict there the o⁄-schedule incentive
constraint for the high type of government under di⁄erent discount factors. As illustrated, when
￿ = ￿W
A , a government with the high type is just indi⁄erent between applying a tari⁄ at the bound
level ￿W
A and cheating. The discount factor ￿B is big in the sense that ￿B > ￿W
A . If a government
with a high type has this level of patience, the incentive to cheat when the bound tari⁄ is ￿W
A is
smaller than the discounted value of cooperation. Finally, the discount factor ￿S is small in the
sense that ￿S < ￿W
A . For a small discount factor, governments are su¢ ciently impatient that a
government with the high type would cheat on an agreement to honor the binding ￿W
A . Before
discussing the agreement that less patient governments would strike, we introduce some de￿nitions.
For a given ￿ 2 (0;1), we de￿ne a weak binding ￿W as an equilibrium binding if there exists a
weak-binding equilibrium in which governments use the weak binding ￿W. For a given ￿ 2 (0;1),
we next de￿ne a weak binding ￿W as a most-cooperative equilibrium binding if no other equilibrium
binding exists that o⁄ers higher expected joint welfare. Formally, the most-cooperative equilibrium
binding is the weak binding ￿W that solves the following program:
max
￿W EJ(￿(￿;￿W);￿) subject to (18).
Equivalently, the most-cooperative equilibrium binding is the ￿W that maximizes !(￿W) subject
to (18). We denote the most-cooperative equilibrium binding as ￿W(￿).
As our discussion above suggests, for ￿ ￿ ￿W
A , the most-cooperative equilibrium binding is
simply the optimal weak binding: ￿W(￿) = ￿W
A . As Figure 5 illustrates, for ￿ < ￿W
A , we may
characterize ￿W(￿) as the lowest ￿ such that ￿(￿;H) = ￿
1￿￿!(￿). Notice that ￿W(￿) 2 (￿W
A ;￿N(H))
for ￿ 2 (0;￿W
A ) and that ￿W(￿) approaches ￿N(H) as ￿ goes to zero. It is straightforward to verify
that ￿W(￿) is di⁄erentiable and strictly decreasing in ￿ 2 (0;￿W
A ): The applied tari⁄s induced by the
most-cooperative equilibrium binding are given by the schedule ￿(￿;￿W(￿)). These applied tari⁄s
are illustrated in Figure 6 as a function of the discount factor. Notice that as governments become
less patient, the most-cooperative equilibrium binding rises, and this enables a government with a
high type to apply a higher tari⁄. In turn, when this government applies a higher tari⁄, its incentive
18It is interesting to observe that, in the repeated game with transitory shocks, the critical discount factor, ￿
W
A ,
for supporting a weak-binding equilibrium in which governments use the optimal weak binding, ￿
W
A , is lower than
the critical discount factor for supporting an equilibrium in which the governments apply tari⁄s equal to the optimal
strong binding, ￿
S
A, in each period. When governments ￿pool￿ applied tari⁄s at the optimal strong binding, they
introduce an incentive to cheat for the low type (since ￿
S
A > ￿
N(L) under our parameter restriction), raise the





N(H)), and generate a lower expected future value of
cooperation (by Proposition 3). Pooling equilibria may be more easily enforced when types are persistent, however,
as we discuss in the next section.
22to cheat is diminished. In this general way, less patient governments can achieve some cooperation
by raising the weak binding just enough to dissuade a high-type government from cheating.
We may now state the following proposition:
Proposition 7: Consider the repeated game with transitory shocks. (a) There exists ￿W
A 2 (0;1)
such that, for all ￿ ￿ ￿W
A , the most-cooperative equilibrium binding is the optimal weak bind-
ing: ￿W(￿) = ￿W
A . (b) For ￿ 2 (0;￿W
A ), the most-cooperative equilibrium binding is ￿W(￿) 2
(￿W
A ;￿N(H)), where ￿W(￿) is di⁄erentiable and strictly decreasing in ￿. (c) The critical discount
factor, ￿W
A , is di⁄erentiable and strictly decreasing in ￿H.
Proposition 7 summarizes our formal analysis of the repeated game with transitory shocks. Bagwell
and Staiger (2005) ￿nd that part (a) also holds in a model with a continuum of types. Using our
two-type formulation, in parts (b) and (c) we show further that cooperation entails a higher weak
binding when governments are less patient and that cooperation is easier (i.e., ￿W
A is lower) among
governments that often face high political-economy pressures. We will see that related themes arise
in subsequent sections, when we allow for persistent types.
5 Enforcement: Perfectly Persistent Shocks
In the preceding section, we assume that governments privately observe political-economic pressures
that are transitory in nature. In this section, we maintain the assumption that each government
has some private information about its political-economic pressures; however, we now relax the as-
sumption that these pressures are transitory. While the assumption of transitory shocks simpli￿es
the analysis, it seems more realistic to allow that political-economic pressures exhibit some persis-
tence. Once persistence is introduced, the analysis becomes more complex, since a government￿ s
tari⁄ in the current period may reveal its current type and thereby reveal information about the
government￿ s probable future type. In the current section, we relax the assumption of transitory
shocks by taking the opposite extreme case and supposing that a government￿ s type is perfectly
persistent through time. In the next section, we discuss the case of imperfectly persistent shocks.
5.1 The Dynamic Game with Perfectly Persistent Shocks
The dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks is informally described as follows. At the start of
the game, each government privately observes its type, where types are independently distributed
across governments and perfectly persistent (i.e., ￿xed) through time. The game is otherwise the
same as the repeated game with transitory shocks. Thus, in any period t, governments simulta-
neously apply their tari⁄s, given the public history of previous applied tari⁄s and governments￿
private observations as to their respective types. Since types are now persistent over time, the
game is no longer a repeated game. It is instead a dynamic game.
As our solution concept, we consider perfect bayesian equilibria (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991)
that satisfy the further re￿nement that each government uses a public strategy. In turn, a govern-
23ment uses a public strategy if in any period its applied tari⁄ depends only on the public history at
that time and its payo⁄-relevant private information. For our model, a government￿ s payo⁄-relevant
private information is its type, ￿ 2 fL;Hg. Following Athey and Bagwell (2008), we may refer to
such re￿ned equilibria as perfect public bayesian equilibria. Perfect public bayesian equilibrium is a
natural extension of perfect public equilibrium to dynamic bayesian games as opposed to repeated
games. In the dynamic game with persistent types, perfect public bayesian equilibria are de￿ned
in terms of the strategy that each government uses in the dynamic game and the belief function
that each government uses when making inferences about the other government￿ s type. In a perfect
public bayesian equilibrium, each government￿ s public strategy must be sequentially rational and
its belief function must be bayesian where possible given the public history of observed tari⁄s and
its understanding of the other government￿ s equilibrium strategy.
Since governments are ex ante symmetric, we also restrict attention to symmetric perfect public
bayesian equilibria. As in the previous section, the requirement of symmetry means that strategies
are exchangeable across governments and do not depend on governments￿￿names.￿Even though
governments use ex ante symmetric strategies, asymmetries in governments￿strategies may emerge
over time, as a result of asymmetric type realizations and past behavior. We refer to symmetric
perfect public bayesian equilibria as equilibria.
In the dynamic game with perfectly persistent types, we may again distinguish between on-
schedule and o⁄-schedule deviations. An on-schedule deviation is now a deviation in which a
government with type ￿ 2 fL;Hg mimics the behavior that it would take were its type ￿0 2 fL;Hg;
where ￿ 6= ￿0, in all periods of the game and for all public histories. An o⁄-schedule deviation
occurs whenever a government applies tari⁄s that are not consistent with the equilibrium strategies
of either type of government.
We assume that governments negotiate a trade agreement at date zero, before they learn their
respective types for the dynamic game. The probability that a government receives a high (low)
type for the dynamic game is ￿H (￿L). We focus again on the possibility of an agreement among
governments to use a weak binding. In previous sections, we de￿ne the applied tari⁄s that are
induced by an agreement to use a weak binding. Here, we consider whether these induced applied
tari⁄s can be enforced in an equilibrium of the dynamic game with perfectly persistent types. We
identify a problem that may be associated with the enforcement of these tari⁄s. We then consider
alternative applied tari⁄s that can be enforced when a weak binding is used.
5.2 Weak-Binding Equilibria
As in the previous section, we de￿ne a weak-binding equilibrium as an equilibrium in which there
exists a weak binding, ￿W, such that (i) along the equilibrium path, governments apply tari⁄s that
are equal to or below ￿W, and (ii) at any period t, the applied tari⁄s selected by governments are
independent of the public history so long as no government has previously applied a tari⁄in excess of
￿W. Recall that the second requirement posits that any applied tari⁄at or below the weak binding is
￿￿ne.￿Thus, in a weak-binding equilibrium, the applied tari⁄schedule ￿(￿;￿W) = minf￿W;￿N(￿)g
24is induced in all periods along the equilibrium path.
In a weak-binding equilibrium, if a government undertakes an o⁄-schedule deviation in which it
applies a tari⁄in excess of ￿W, then governments abdandon cooperation and revert to Nash tari⁄s in
all future periods. Importantly, in the dynamic game with persistent types, a government￿ s expected
welfare under Nash play depends upon the government￿ s type and the government￿ s belief about
the other government￿ s type. If one government believes that the other government probably has a
high (low) type, then the former government expects that a Nash punishment would probably mean
that its exporters would face the tari⁄ ￿N(H) (￿N(L)). A government￿ s belief must be bayesian in
equilibrium, and so a government￿ s expected value of future cooperation may be in￿ uenced by the
particular applied tari⁄s selected by the other government. Thus, while any applied tari⁄ below
the weak binding may be ￿ne, it is unavoidable that one government￿ s particular selections may
a⁄ect the other government￿ s bayesian beliefs about the former government￿ s type.
We distinguish between two ranges for the weak binding. Suppose ￿rst that ￿W > ￿N(L). This
range includes the optimal weak binding, ￿W
A . When ￿W > ￿N(L), a weak-binding equilibrium is
possible only if a government with a low type applies the tari⁄ ￿(L;￿W) = ￿N(L) in all periods
along the equilibrium path. Likewise, if ￿W ￿ ￿N(H), then a government with a high type applies
the tari⁄ ￿(H;￿W) = ￿N(H) in all periods along the equilibrium path. We conclude that there
exists a weak-binding equilibrium in which ￿W ￿ ￿N(H), and in any such equilibrium a government
of type ￿ 2 fL;Hg applies its Nash tari⁄ ￿N(￿) in every period. Thus, a weak-binding equilibrium
with ￿W ￿ ￿N(H) exists but does not improve on the no-agreement Nash equilibrium benchmark.
If instead ￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)), then a weak-binding equilibrium exists only if a government with
a high type applies the tari⁄ ￿(H;￿W) = ￿W in all periods along the equilibrium path. Hence, if
￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)), then a weak-binding equilibrium can exist only if, in all periods along the
equilibrium path, a government with a low type applies the tari⁄ ￿N(L) and a government with a
high type applies the tari⁄ ￿W.
Let us now consider the o⁄-schedule incentive constraint that arises for a government with
a high type in a weak-binding equilibrium when ￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)). In particular, suppose
that one government has a high type while the other government has a low type. In period one,
the former government necessarily applies the tari⁄ ￿W while the latter government necessarily
applies the tari⁄ ￿N(L). At this point, the governments can infer each other￿ s types, and the
former government thus knows that the latter government has a low type. In the second period, a
government with a high type then cannot resist taking an o⁄-schedule deviation in which it violates
the binding and applies its Nash tari⁄, ￿N(H). With respect to its import good, this government
gains from such an o⁄-schedule deviation, since it thereby applies its Nash tari⁄ in the current and
all future periods. With respect to its export good, this government does not gain or lose, since it
knows that the low-type government applies the tari⁄ ￿N(L) in period two and all future periods
both on and o⁄ of the equilibrium path (i.e., whether the governments continue cooperating or
revert to an in￿nite Nash punishment). Hence, it cannot be true that a government with a high
type applies the tari⁄ ￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)) in all periods along the equilibrium path, and we
25therefore conclude that a weak-binding equilibrium fails to exist when ￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)).
The following proposition summarizes our discussion to this point:
Proposition 8: Consider the dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks. (i) There exists
a weak-binding equilibrium with ￿W ￿ ￿N(H). In any such equilibrium, a government of type
￿ 2 fL;Hg applies its Nash tari⁄ ￿N(￿) in every period. (ii) There does not exist a weak-binding
equilibrium with ￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)):
Part (ii) of this proposition is most interesting and captures a ￿no-good-deed-goes-unpunished￿
phenomenon. When a government has low political-economic pressures and thus applies a tari⁄
below the bound level, the other government gains from this good deed. At the same time, the
other government then realizes that its partner has a low type and thus cannot credibly threaten
to raise its tari⁄s in response to a violation. Given this realization, the other government cannot
resist ￿punishing￿the good deed by cheating and applying a tari⁄in excess of the weak binding. In
e⁄ect, when types are perfectly persistent, a ￿ratchet e⁄ect￿exists with respect to the enforcement
of an agreement to use a weak binding: once a government reveals that it has the weak type, the
other government cannot resist undertaking actions that hurt the former government.19
It is interesting to compare Propositions 7 and 8. When types are transitory, a government
with a low type today may have a high type tomorrow. Thus, when types are transitory and
￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)), a government that cheats today is sure to su⁄er some retaliatory cost in the
future, since the other government will apply ￿N(H) rather than ￿W in all future periods in which it
has a high type. This explains why, as Proposition 7 con￿rms, su¢ ciently patient governments that
face transitory shocks can enforce an agreement to abide by the optimal weak binding. By contrast,
as Proposition 8 establishes, when types are perfectly persistent, a government that reveals itself
to be ￿weak￿in the sense of having low political pressures reveals as well that it cannot impose a
retaliatory cost on a cheating government.
We turn now to the second possible range for the weak binding; speci￿cally, we suppose that
governments agree to set a weak binding that is equal to or below the Nash tari⁄ for the low type:
￿W ￿ ￿N(L). Given that the weak binding falls at or below the Nash tari⁄s for both the low and
high types of government, a weak-binding equilibrium can exist only if both types of government
apply the tari⁄ ￿W in all periods along the equilibrium path.
To examine the o⁄-schedule incentive constraint, we begin with the short-term incentive to
cheat. The most attractive o⁄-schedule deviation for a government with type ￿ is its Nash tari⁄,
￿N(￿). Using (13), the short-term incentive to cheat for a government with type ￿ is thus ￿(￿W;￿).
It is direct to con￿rm that the incentive to cheat is greatest for a government with the high
type: ￿(￿W;H) ￿ ￿(￿W;L) = [Wx(￿N(H);H) ￿ Wx(￿W;H)] ￿ [Wx(￿N(L);L) ￿ Wx(￿W;L)] >
[Wx(￿N(L);H)￿Wx(￿W;H)]￿[Wx(￿N(L);L)￿Wx(￿W;L)] ￿ 0; where the ￿nal inequality follows
since f0 > 0 and ￿N(L) ￿ ￿W.
19The ratchet e⁄ect arises in dynamic contracting problems with incomplete information in which long-term con-
tracts are infeasible. See, for example, Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) and La⁄ont and Tirole (1988).
26Consider now the future value of cooperation. If a government cheats in period t, then in all
future periods governments apply their Nash tari⁄s rather than the bound tari⁄, ￿W. In contrast
to our analysis of the repeated game with transitory shocks, we must now allow that the per-period
value of cooperation depends upon a government￿ s persistent type. In particular, when governments
seek to enforce a weak-binding equilibrium and ￿W ￿ ￿N(L), we now de￿ne the per-period value
of cooperation for a government with type ￿ as
e !(￿W;￿) = [Wx(￿W;￿) ￿ Wx(￿N(￿);￿)] + E[W￿
x(￿W) ￿ W￿
x(￿N(￿))]: (20)
Thus, when evaluating the per-period value of cooperation, a government considers its own persis-
tent type and recognizes that with probability ￿H (￿L) the other government will select the tari⁄
￿N(H) (￿N(L)) if cooperation breaks down. The ￿rst term in (20) is negative (and strictly so if
￿W < ￿N(￿)), due to the bene￿t that a government enjoys on its import good when applying its
optimal tari⁄. The second term in (20) is positive when ￿W ￿ ￿N(L), since a government then
experiences a welfare loss on its export good when its trading partner applies Nash tari⁄s.
Rearranging terms slightly, we now con￿rm that the per-period value of cooperation is lower
for a government with a high type: e !(￿W;H) ￿ e !(￿W;L) = ￿(￿W;L) ￿ ￿(￿W;H) < 0, where the
inequality follows as above from f0 > 0 and ￿N(L) ￿ ￿W. Intuitively, whether a government has a
low or high type, it faces the same welfare loss when the other government abandons cooperation
and imposes its Nash tari⁄s. A high type of government, however, gains more from abandoning
￿W and applying its Nash tari⁄ when ￿W ￿ ￿N(L).
For the dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks, if governments seek to enforce a weak-
binding equilibrium and ￿W ￿ ￿N(L), then the o⁄-schedule incentive constraint is




Given ￿W ￿ ￿N(L), we con￿rm above that the LHS of this constraint is largest when ￿ = H and
that the RHS is smallest when ￿ = H. Thus, when ￿W ￿ ￿N(L), (21) holds if and only if the





With the o⁄-schedule incentive constraint thus represented, we are in a position to characterize the
conditions under which there exist weak-binding equilibria with ￿W ￿ ￿N(L).
To this end, we rearrange (20) and observe that the per-period value of cooperation for a
government with a high type can be written as
e !(￿W;H) = [J(￿W;H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H)] + ￿L[W￿
x(￿N(H)) ￿ W￿
x(￿N(L))]: (23)
When ￿W ￿ ￿N(L), our parameter restriction yields ￿W ￿ ￿N(L) < ￿E(H) and thus J(￿W;H) ￿
27J(￿N(L);H). Given that the second term in (23) is clearly negative, the following conclusion is
now apparent: when ￿W ￿ ￿N(L), if J(￿N(L);H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H), then e !(￿W;H) < 0. Hence,
if J(￿N(L);H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H), then the o⁄-schedule incentive constraint (22) cannot hold when
￿W ￿ ￿N(L), and so in this case there does not exist a weak-binding equilibrium with ￿W ￿ ￿N(L).
The other possibility is that ￿W ￿ ￿N(L) and J(￿N(L);H) > J(￿N(H);H). In this event, we
may conclude from (23) that e !(￿W;H) > 0 if ￿W is su¢ ciently close to ￿N(L) and ￿L is su¢ ciently
small. Let us set ￿W = ￿N(L) and thereby maximize the opportunity to achieve a positive value
for e !(￿W;H) when ￿W ￿ ￿N(L). Using (23), we ￿nd that e !(￿N(L);H) > 0 if and only if
￿H > ￿






Referring to (24), we see that ￿
H 2 (0;1) if and only if J(￿N(L);H) > J(￿N(H);H): We conclude
that, if ￿H > ￿
H, then there exists some critical discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1) such that, for all ￿ 2 (￿;1),
(22) holds when ￿W = ￿N(L).
Building slightly from the preceding discussion, we can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 9: Consider the dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks. (i) If J(￿N(L);H) ￿
J(￿N(H);H), or if J(￿N(L);H) > J(￿N(H);H) and ￿H ￿ ￿
H, then there does not exist a weak-
binding equilibrium with ￿W ￿ ￿N(L). (ii) If J(￿N(L);H) > J(￿N(H);H) and ￿H 2 (￿
H;1),
then there exists ￿ 2 (0;1) such that, for all ￿ 2 (￿;1), a weak-binding equilibrium exists with
￿W = ￿N(L).
Intuitively, if ￿W = ￿N(L) and a government has a high type, then under cooperation the govern-
ment enjoys welfare J(￿N(L);H) in all future periods. If instead the government were to cheat,
then it would apply its Nash tari⁄, ￿N(H), in all future periods. The other government would then
raise its tari⁄ and apply ￿N(H) in all future periods as well, if its type were also high. Cooper-
ation is thus easier to enforce when ￿H is larger, as then the other government is more likely to
have a high type. In the limiting case where ￿H = 1, cheating induces both governments to apply
￿N(H) in all future periods, and the cheating government enjoys welfare J(￿N(H);H) in all future
periods. Clearly, a government with a high type will thus cheat if J(￿N(L);H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H),
or if J(￿N(L);H) > J(￿N(H);H) but ￿H is small. Cooperation can be enforced, however, if
J(￿N(L);H) > J(￿N(H);H) and ￿H is large, since in that case a su¢ ciently patient government
will forgo the short-term gain from cheating in view of the future cost of a breakdown in cooperation.
Finally, we recall from (10) that J(￿N(L);H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H) takes the same sign as L ￿ LN(H).
Thus, a weak-binding equilibrium exists with ￿W ￿ ￿N(L) only if H ￿ L is su¢ ciently small.20
20In terms of Figure 2, a weak-binding equilibrium with ￿
W ￿ ￿
N(L) fails to exist if (H;L) falls in the region
of points that lie on or to the southeast of L
N(H): Within this region, there exists a subregion of pairs (H;L) for




x(1=6). The RHS of this inequality is the
(per-period) minmax value for a government with a high type; thus, if H and L are such that this inequality holds,
then the payo⁄ for a government with a high type in a putative weak-binding equilibrium in which ￿
W ￿ ￿
N(L)
would fail even to be individually rational.
28Propositions 8 and 9 identify only a limited sense in which governments may cooperate in a
weak-binding equilibrium. As Proposition 8 indicates, governments may set the weak binding above
the Nash tari⁄ of a government with a high type, but in this case the agreement simply induces
Nash tari⁄s. Alternatively, as Proposition 9 con￿rms, for some parameter regions, governments
can enforce a weak-binding equilibrium in which they set the weak binding at or below the Nash
tari⁄ of a government with a low type. In this case, however, the applied tari⁄ is always set at the
bound rate, and the applied tari⁄ is strictly below the level that is e¢ cient when a single tari⁄ is
applied (i.e., the applied tari⁄ is below ￿E(E￿)).
In the remainder of the paper, we consider ways in which this limitation might be overcome.
First, when a weak binding is used that exceeds the Nash tari⁄ for a government with a low type,
such a government might recognize that, when it applies its Nash tari⁄, it reveals that it is ￿weak￿
and thus encourages the other government to cheat. This motivates consideration of a di⁄erent
class of equilibria, in which all applied tari⁄s at or below the weak binding do not necessarily
generate the same continuation path. In this class, we focus in the next subsection on pooling
equilibria, wherein the low- and high-types of governments apply the same tari⁄ at all dates along
the equilibrium path.21 Second, we examine in this section an extreme case in which types are
perfectly persistent. In Section 6, we consider weak-binding equilibria in a more realistic model in
which types are imperfectly persistent. Third, in Section 7, we return to the dynamic game with
perfectly persistent shocks and consider a class of equilibria in which the weak binding descends
gradually over time as a function of the types revealed by applied tari⁄s in early periods.22
5.3 Pooling Equilibria
We now assume that governments negotiate an agreement to use a weak binding, ￿W; however,
we relax the second restriction imposed in our de￿nition of a weak-binding equilibrium and now
allow that the continuation of play may depend on the particular way in which governments apply
tari⁄s to satisfy the weak-binding obligation. In particular, one theme of our analysis above is that
a government may reveal itself to be weak (i.e., a low type) and incapable of e⁄ective retaliation,
when it applies a tari⁄ strictly below the weak binding. Rather than look weak and invite an
o⁄-schedule deviation by its trading partner, a government with a low type might choose instead to
apply the bound tari⁄, even when its optimal tari⁄is lower. When a government applies the bound
tari⁄whether its type is high or low, its type cannot be inferred; consequently, the other government
may hesitate to cheat with an o⁄-schedule deviation, since it is possible that the retaliatory tari⁄
21Pooling often arises as well in dynamic contracting problems in which a ratchet e⁄ect is present. See, for example,
Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) and La⁄ont and Tirole (1988).
22A fourth approach would be to consider sophisticated carrot-stick punishment schemes. In such a scheme, the
punishment phase ￿re-starts" if a deviation occurs within that phase. In the present context, for su¢ ciently patient
governments, such schemes may deliver worse-than-Nash punishments. As discussed at the start of Section 4, however,
we do not pursue this approach here, since it seems unlikely that a breakdown in a cooperative trade agreement would
be consistent with the coordination of a sophisticated punishment path. We note that our association of Nash tari⁄s
with the absence of cooperation is standard in the trade literature. The Nash tari⁄s represent the non-cooperative
benchmark in most work that characterizes the value of a trade agreement; likewise, the Nash tari⁄s are associated
with the breakdown of cooperation in most work that examines self-enforcing trade agreements.
29would be the Nash tari⁄ of a high-type government.
Re￿ ecting this line of thought, we thus now analyze pooling equilibria, which are equilibria in
which in every period along the equilibrium path each government of each type applies the same
tari⁄. We can understand pooling equilibria as being induced by a weak binding, ￿W, if we assume
that each government of each type applies the bound tari⁄ exactly, in order not to be perceived
as being weak. This interpretation is motivated in the preceding paragraph. Of course, pooling
equilibria can also be understood in terms of an agreement to use a strong binding. Emphasizing
the ￿rst interpretation, we refer to a pooling equilibrium in which governments apply the bound
tari⁄ ￿W in all periods along the equilibrium path as a pooling equilibrium at the weak binding.
Consider now the o⁄-schedule incentive constraint for a pooling equilibrium at the weak binding,
when the weak binding, ￿W, satis￿es ￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)). Each government understands that if
it applies a tari⁄ below the weak binding, then the other government will believe that it is weak.
This belief will encourage the other government to cheat in the following period and induce Nash
tari⁄s for the remainder of time. Consequently, if a government applies a tari⁄ below the weak
binding in period t, it should apply its Nash tari⁄ in period t + 1 and thereafter. Likewise, each
government understands that if it applies a tari⁄ in excess of the weak binding, then its action
will be interpreted as cheating, with the result being that both governments apply Nash tari⁄s in
the next and all subsequent periods. Given this construction, the key o⁄-schedule constraint is
that, whatever its type, a government must earn greater expected discounted welfare when both
governments cooperate and apply the bound tari⁄, ￿W; throughout time than when the government
cheats with an o⁄-schedule deviation to its Nash tari⁄ and thereby induces both governments to
apply Nash tari⁄s in all future periods. Notice that a government with a high type thus contemplates
a deviation to a tari⁄ that exceeds the bound rate (￿N(H) > ￿W) and is in this sense a violation
whereas a government with a low type evaluates a deviation to a tari⁄ that falls below the bound
rate (￿N(L) < ￿W) and thereby signals weakness.
Formally, for a pooling equilibrium at the weak binding, the o⁄-schedule constraint must hold
for both types of government and is given by (21). Above, we argue that this constraint binds ￿rst
for a high type of government, when ￿W ￿ ￿N(L). We assume in this subsection, however, that
￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)). Hence, it is not clear whether the o⁄-schedule incentive constraint binds
￿rst for a government with a high or low type. If governments anticipate a pooling equilibrium
at the weak binding and seek to maximize expected joint welfare, then the most attractive weak
binding is ￿W = ￿S
A = ￿E(E￿). As in our analysis of the optimal strong binding, when governments
anticipate that a single applied tari⁄ will be applied in all periods along the equilibrium path, they
prefer that the applied tari⁄ be the tari⁄ that is e¢ cient for the expected type. We thus focus on
the o⁄-schedule constraint when ￿W = ￿E(E￿).
Let us now examine the o⁄-schedule constraint in more detail. For a government of type













Thus, the o⁄-schedule constraint holds when ￿W = ￿E(E￿) if and only if
8￿ 2 fL;Hg, ￿(￿E(E￿);￿) ￿ ￿[W￿
x(￿E(E￿)) ￿ EW￿
x(￿N(￿))]: (25)
As established in Proposition 1, the RHS of (25) is strictly positive. Notice that the RHS is
independent of the deviating government￿ s type and captures the expected welfare loss that the
deviating government experiences when the other government applies its Nash tari⁄ rather than
the bound tari⁄. Our next step is to understand how the LHS of (25) varies with ￿:
Consider then how the incentive to cheat varies with the government￿ s type when ￿W = ￿E(E￿).
At one extreme, if L is only slightly below L(H;￿H), then ￿E(E￿) is only slightly above ￿N(L);
thus, the incentive to cheat for a government with the low type is approximately zero. In this case,
a government with a high type has the greatest incentive to cheat. At the other extreme, if ￿H is
close to unity so that ￿E(E￿) is close to ￿E(H), and if H is large and close to 7=4 so that ￿E(H) is
close to ￿N(H), then the incentive to cheat for a government with the high type is approximately
zero. In this case, the incentive to cheat is greatest for a government with the low type. Thus,
when ￿W = ￿E(E￿), the type of government that has the greatest incentive to cheat varies with
the parameters of the model.
To further explore the incentive to cheat, we may pick any (L;H) that lies below the function
L(H;1). We then ￿nd e ￿H 2 (0;1) such that L = L(H;e ￿H). When ￿H = e ￿H, we have that
￿N(L) = ￿E(E￿), and our parameter restriction requires that ￿H 2 (e ￿H;1). Now, let us de￿ne
￿￿(￿H) ￿ ￿(￿E(E￿);H) ￿ ￿(￿E(E￿);L). We observe ￿rst that ￿￿(e ￿H) > 0, since as noted a
government with the low type has zero incentive to cheat when ￿N(L) = ￿E(E￿). As we increase
￿H from e ￿H toward unity, ￿E(E￿) rises and so it may be expected that ￿￿(￿H) falls. This is in
fact the case: straightforward calculations con￿rm that ￿
0
￿(￿H) < 0. As ￿H approaches unity,
￿￿(￿H) < 0 is possible; indeed, as noted, if H is close to 7=4, then ￿￿(1) < 0. In this case, the
incentive to cheat is greater for a government with a high type if and only if ￿H is below some
threshold value. For other values of H and L, however, ￿￿(1) > 0: In this case, the incentive to
cheat is greater for a government with a high type, for all permissible values of ￿H: We can show
that ￿￿(1) > 0 if H ￿ L is small in the following sense: 7=4 ￿ H ￿ H ￿ L.
Let us now suppose that the model parameters are such that ￿￿(1) > 0. For all permissible ￿H,
we then know that the o⁄-schedule constraint is most di¢ cult to satisfy when the government has a
high type. Thus, (25) holds if and only if ￿(￿E(E￿);H) ￿ ￿[W￿
x(￿E(E￿))￿EW￿
x(￿N(￿))]. Now, in
the limiting case where ￿H = 1, we have that ￿E(E￿) = ￿E(H) and EW￿
x(￿N(￿)) = W￿
x(￿N(H)).
In this limiting case, if in addition we put ￿ = 1; then we can rewrite the preceding inequality as
31J(￿N(H);H) ￿ J(￿E(H);H). Since ￿E(H) uniquely maximizes J(￿;H), we conclude that (25)
holds when ￿￿(1) > 0 if ￿ and ￿H are each su¢ ciently close to unity.
We summarize our ￿ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 10: Consider the dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks. Suppose ￿￿(1) > 0.
Then there exists ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿
H 2 (0;1) such that for all ￿ 2 (￿;1) and for all ￿H 2 (￿
H;1),
there exists a pooling equilibrium at the weak binding, in which the weak binding is ￿E(E￿).
This proposition illustrates one parameter region over which governments can support a pooling
equilibrium in which they always apply the tari⁄ that is e¢ cient for the expected type.23 The
construction is not trivial, since both types of government have incentives to cheat.
6 Enforcement: Imperfectly Persistent Shocks
In the preceding two sections, we analyze the extreme cases in which governments privately observe
political-economic pressures that are either transitory or perfectly persistent. Building on this
analysis, we now consider a more realistic model in which governments￿ types are imperfectly
persistent through time. When a government￿ s type exhibits imperfect persistence, its tari⁄ in the
current period may reveal its current type and thereby information about its probable future type.
6.1 The Dynamic Game with Imperfectly Peristent Shocks
The dynamic game with imperfectly persistent shocks is informally described as follows. At the
start of the game, each government privately observes its current type, where types are indepen-
dently distributed across governments and imperfectly persistent through time. As described below,
governments￿types evolve independently over time according to a Markov process. The game is
otherwise the same as those analyzed in the previous two sections. Thus, in any given period, gov-
ernments simultaneously apply their tari⁄s, each government has a private history which includes
its knowledge of its current type, and goverments share the public history of previous applied tari⁄s.
Since governments￿types exhibit some persistence over time, the game is a dynamic game.
A government￿ s type evolves over time according to a simple Markov process. For each gov-
ernment, if the government has the low (high) type in period t, then it has the high (low) type
in period t + 1 with probability ￿. We assume that ￿ 2 (0;1=2), so that types exhibit positive
persistence through time. Notice that the repeated game with transitory shocks corresponds to a
setting in which ￿ = 1=2 while the dynamic game with perfectly persistent types corresponds to
a situation in which ￿ = 0.24 Since types evolve according to a Markov process, a government￿ s
23Recall that ￿￿(1) > 0 holds if 7=4￿H ￿ H ￿L. Equivalently, ￿￿(1) > 0 holds if L ￿ L(H;2=3). Recall as well
that our parameter restriction can be stated as L(H;￿H) > L: Thus, for any ￿H 2 (2=3;1), there exist values for H
and L such that ￿￿(1) > 0 and our parameter restriction both hold.
24When ￿H = 1=2, the repeated game with transitory shocks generates the same distribution of types as does the
dynamic game with imperfectly persistent shocks when ￿ = 1=2.
32knowledge of its own current type (belief as to the other government￿ s current type) su¢ ces for
forming an expectation as to its (the other government￿ s) type in the next period.
For our solution concept, we consider perfect bayesian equilibria (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991)
in which governments use public strategies. A government uses a public strategy if in any period
its applied tari⁄ depends only on the public history at that time and its payo⁄-relevant private
information. Given our Markov assumption, a government￿ s payo⁄-relevant private information at
date t is its current type. Following Athey and Bagwell (2008), we again refer to such re￿ned equi-
libria as perfect public bayesian equilibria. In the dynamic game with imperfectly persistent types,
perfect public bayesian equilibria are de￿ned in terms of the strategy that each government uses in
the dynamic game and the belief function that each government uses when making inferences about
the other government￿ s type. In a perfect public bayesian equilibrium, each government￿ s public
strategy must be sequentially rational, and its belief function must be bayesian where possible given
the public history of observed tari⁄s and its understanding of the other government￿ s equilibrium
strategy and the underlying Markov process that governs the evolution of types. As before, we
assume that governments use ex ante symmetric strategies and thus restrict attention to symmetric
perfect public bayesian equilibria. In this section, we refer to symmetric perfect public bayesian
equilibria for the dynamic game with imperfectly persistent types as equilibria.
In the dynamic game with imperfectly persistent types, if in period t a government with one type
mimics the behavior that is prescribed in equilibrium for the government when it has the other type,
then the government has undertaken an on-schedule deviation. An o⁄-schedule deviation occurs in
the dynamic game with imperfectly persistent types whenever a government applies a tari⁄in some
period t that is not prescribed under the equilibrium strategy for either type that the government
may have observed in period t. Even when a government sees that the other governments has
undertaken an o⁄-schedule deviation, the former government￿ s beliefs as to the evolution over time
of the deviating government￿ s type must respect the Markov structure described above.25
Once again, we assume that governments negotiate a trade agreement at date zero, before they
learn their period-one types for the dynamic game. For simplicity, we assume that a government
receives the high type in period one with probability ￿H = 1=2.26 We focus again on the possibility
of an agreement among governments to use a weak binding. In contrast to our ￿ndings for the
dynamic game with perfectly persistent types, we show that concerns about signaling ￿weakness￿
will not undermine governments￿willingness to apply tari⁄s below the weak binding, if governments
are su¢ ciently patient, where the critical level of patience is higher when types are more persistent.
6.2 Weak-Binding Equilibria
As before, we de￿ne a weak-binding equilibrium as an equilibrium in which there exists a weak
binding, ￿W, such that (i) along the equilibrium path, governments apply tari⁄s that are equal to
25See Athey and Bagwell (2008) for formal de￿nitions of equilibrium, on- and o⁄-schedule deviations, and the
evolution of beliefs in a related dynamic game with imperfectly persistent types.
26This is the stationary distribution for our Markov process. Our parameter restriction can then be speci￿ed with
respect to this value for ￿H.
33or below ￿W, and (ii) at any period t, the applied tari⁄s selected by governments are independent
of the public history so long as no government has previously applied a tari⁄ in excess of ￿W.
As argued above, in a weak-binding equilibrium, the weak binding ￿W induces the applied tari⁄
schedule ￿(￿;￿W) = minf￿W;￿N(￿)g in all periods along the equilibrium path.
As formalized in Propositions 8 and 9, for the dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks,
weak-binding equilibria often fail to exist; in particular, they do not exist when the weak binding is
set at the optimal weak binding, ￿W
A , where ￿W
A = ￿E(H) 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)) under our parameter
restriction. In that model, a government with a low type that goes below the bound rate and
applies its Nash tari⁄ reveals its permanent type; consequently, it reveals as well that it would
apply the same tari⁄ in future periods whether or not the other government goes on to cheat and
apply a tari⁄ in excess of the binding. We expect this problem to be mitigated somewhat in the
dynamic game with imperfectly persistent shocks, since a government that has a low type in one
period may have a high type in later periods.
To explore this intuition, we assume that governments agree to use the optimal weak binding,
￿W
A , and we analyze the associated o⁄-schedule incentive constraints. Given our focus on weak-
binding equilibria, a government with a low type applies its Nash tari⁄, and so a positive incentive
to cheat is present only for a government with a high type. As before, the incentive to cheat is given
as ￿(￿W
A ;H) = Wx(￿N(H);H) ￿ Wx(￿W
A ;H). The novel aspect of our analysis here concerns the
future value of cooperation. In a weak-binding equilibrium, governments￿applied tari⁄s reveal their
current types; hence, at the start of any period t, each government can look back at the applied
tari⁄s in period t ￿ 1 and infer the type that the other government had in that period. Given
that types exhibit imperfect persistence, a government can use this inference to better forecast the
evolution of the other government￿ s type. In turn, this inference helps the government forecast the
expected discounted welfare loss that would be associated with a breakdown in cooperation. Thus,
when a government observes its own type and contemplates cheating in period t, its assessment of
the future value of cooperation depends on its type in period t and the type that it infers the other
government had in period t ￿ 1.
Our characterization of the future value of cooperation is facilitated by solving a four-by-four
recursive system for the values V￿￿￿, where ￿ 2 fL;Hg, ￿￿ 2 fL;Hg and V￿￿￿ represents the
expected discounted future value of cooperation as evaluated at the start of period t when govern-
ments know that their respective types in period t ￿ 1 were ￿ and ￿￿ but have not yet observed
their respective period-t types. The recursive system takes the following form:
V￿￿￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)2[A￿￿￿ + ￿V￿￿￿] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿[A￿b ￿￿ + ￿V￿b ￿￿] (26)
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)[Ab ￿￿￿ + ￿Vb ￿￿￿] + ￿2[Ab ￿b ￿￿ + ￿Vb ￿b ￿￿]
where b ￿ 2 fL;Hg and b ￿ 6= ￿, b ￿￿ 2 fL;Hg and b ￿￿ 6= ￿￿, and as discussed next the four ￿A￿
variables re￿ ect the per-period value of cooperation under each possible state.
In a weak-binding equilibrium in which governments use the optimal weak binding, along the
34equilibrium path a government with a low type applies its Nash tari⁄, ￿N(L), and a government
with a high type applies the optimal weak binding, ￿W
A . But if cooperation were to break down, a
government would always apply its Nash tari⁄. Thus, we de￿ne the four ￿A￿variables as follows:
ALL = 0; (27)
AHH = J(￿W
A ;H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H) > 0;
ALH = W￿
x(￿W
A ) ￿ W￿
x(￿N(H)) > 0;
AHL = Wx(￿W
A ;H) ￿ Wx(￿N(H);H) < 0
Intuitively, when both governments have the low type, they apply their Nash tari⁄s whether or
not cooperation occurs, and so ALL = 0. Similarly, if both governments have the high type, then
they both apply ￿W
A under cooperation and ￿N(H) when cooperation breaks down, and so AHH
can be described in terms of joint welfare and is positive. If a government has a low type while
its trading partner has a high type, then the government values cooperation, since it applies the
same Nash tari⁄ either way but faces a higher tari⁄ on its export good when cooperation fails. It
follows that ALH > 0. If a government has a high type and its trading partner does not, then the
government enjoys a breakdown in cooperation: AHL < 0. Intuitively, the government then enjoys
applying its Nash tari⁄when cooperation fails and faces the same tari⁄on its exports whether or not
cooperation fails. Finally, we see from (27) that AHH = ALH + AHL, and thus that ALH > AHH:
Using ALL = 0 and AHH = ALH + AHL, we may solve (26) to get
VLL = AHH
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ 2￿))
; (28)
VHH = AHH
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ 2￿)








(1 ￿ 2￿)(AHL ￿ ALH)








(1 ￿ 2￿)(AHL ￿ ALH)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ 2￿)
:
Using (27), the solutions in (28) may be expressed in terms of the underlying welfare functions.
Notice that all four values are equal in the limiting case where shocks are transitory: V￿￿￿ ￿
AHH=[2(1 ￿ ￿)] when ￿ = 1=2. Under our assumption that ￿ 2 (0;1=2), we can show that
VLH > VHH > VLL > VHL (29)
Thus, the expected future value of cooperation is highest when in the previous period a government
had a low type while its trading partner had a high type. Intuitively, in that case, if types persist
and cooperation occurs, the government already applies its optimal tari⁄ and also faces a below-
Nash tari⁄from its trading partner. At the other extreme, the expected future value of cooperation
is lowest when in the previous period a government had the high type and the other government
35had the low type. Indeed, when ￿ is su¢ ciently small so that types are unlikely to change across
periods, VHL < 0. Further, for all ￿ 2 (0;1=2), VLH > VHH > VLL > 0.
We are now ready to consider the o⁄-schedule constraint. As noted, in any period t, a govern-
ment has a positive short-term incentive to cheat if and only if it has a high type. In period t,
the government also has inferred the type that its trading partner had in period t ￿ 1. Now, the
tari⁄ that the trading partner applies in period t is independent of whether or not the government
cheats in period t. The government thus understands that a decision to cheat in period t a⁄ects the
applied tari⁄ of its trading partner starting in period t+1. The government that is contemplating
cheating in period t thus must consider the future value of cooperation that cheating would sacri￿ce
starting in period t + 1. Due to persistence, this value is a⁄ected by the government￿ s inference as
to its trading partner￿ s type in period t ￿ 1.
For a government with a high type in period t that is contemplating cheating, there are thus
two cases. First, if the trading partner applied ￿W
A in period t ￿ 1 and thereby revealed a high
type in that period, then at the close of period t the trading partner would have the low type with
probability ￿ and the high type with probability 1￿￿. Hence, in this case, a government in period t
regards the future value of cooperation starting in period t+1 to be ￿[￿VHL+(1￿￿)VHH]. Second,
if the trading partner applied ￿N(L) in period t￿1 and thus revealed a low type in that period, then
at the close of period t the trading partner would have a high type with probability ￿ and a low type
with probability 1￿￿. For this case, a government in period t regards the future value of cooperation
starting in period t + 1 to be ￿[￿VHH + (1 ￿ ￿)VHL]. The o⁄-schedule constraint in period t for a
government with a high type is thus ￿(￿W
A ;H) ￿ ￿ minf￿VHL +(1￿￿)VHH;￿VHH +(1￿￿)VHLg.
Now, given ￿ 2 (0;1=2) and the rankings in (29), we may con￿rm that the minimum is achieved
by the second argument: ￿VHL + (1 ￿ ￿)VHH > ￿VHH + (1 ￿ ￿)VHL. Thus, we may conclude
that a weak-binding equilibrium at the optimal weak binding exists for the dynamic game with
imperfectly persistent shocks if and only if
￿(￿W
A ;H) ￿ ￿[￿VHH + (1 ￿ ￿)VHL] ￿ RHS(￿;￿): (30)
Our goal now is to characterize the values of ￿ and ￿ for which (30) holds. This characterization is
complicated by the fact that VHL and VHH are functions of ￿ and ￿, as (28) con￿rms.
In the Appendix, we use (28) to derive an explicit expression for RHS(￿;￿). Using (27), we
show there that RHS(0;￿) = ￿




2;￿) and that @RHS(￿;￿)=@￿ > 0
for all ￿ 2 [0;1=2].27 Thus, when a government has a high type and infers that its trading partner￿ s
type was low in the previous period, the value of cooperation for this government is negative when
￿ is su¢ ciently close to zero. Similarly, if ￿ is su¢ ciently close to 1=2, then this government would
perceive the value of cooperation to be positive. The value of cooperation is strictly increasing as
types become less persistent. An implication of these ￿ndings is that, for all ￿ 2 (0;1), there exists
￿￿ 2 (0;1=2) such that RHS(￿￿;￿) = 0. We show in the Appendix that ￿￿ is strictly decreasing in
27We can also show that RHS(￿;￿) is strictly concave in ￿, for all ￿ 2 [0;1=2] and ￿ 2 (0;1):
36￿, approaches zero as ￿ approaches unity, and approaches ￿AHL
2ALH 2 (0;1=2) as ￿ approaches zero. We
show further that @RHS(￿;￿)=@￿ > 0 if ￿ ￿ ￿￿. For lower values of ￿, RHS(￿;￿) may not increase
with ￿; for example, RHS(0;￿) strictly decreases in ￿. We also ￿nd that @2RHS(￿;￿)=@￿@￿ > 0
for all ￿ 2 [0;1=2]. These properties of RHS(￿;￿) are all captured in Figure 7.
We may now characterize the critical discount factor, ￿W
A (￿); above which governments can
support a weak-binding equilibrium in which they apply the tari⁄s that are induced by the optimal
weak binding, ￿W
A . The critical discount factor is the value for ￿ at which (30) binds:
￿(￿W
A ;H) = ￿[￿VHH + (1 ￿ ￿)VHL] ￿ RHS(￿;￿): (31)
Let us now ￿x ￿ 2 (0;1=2) and suppose that we can ￿nd a critical discount factor, ￿W
A (￿), at
which (31) holds. Since the incentive to cheat is strictly positive, it is thus necessary that the
critical discount factor is such that RHS(￿;￿) > 0. In other words, the critical discount factor
must generate a value for ￿￿ such that ￿ > ￿￿. Thus, if a critical discount factor exists, then we








where the inequality uses ￿ > ￿￿. We thus conclude that, if a critical discount factor exists, then it
is strictly lower when governments￿types are less persistent. Put di⁄erently, it is easier to support
a weak-binding equilibrium when types are more transitory.
The remaining step is to address the existence of the critical discount factor. Our arguments
may be developed with reference to Figure 7. The horizontal line represents the incentive to cheat
for a government with a high type. To begin, we consider the limiting case where ￿ = 1=2 ￿ ￿0.
Given the properties of RHS(￿;￿) described above, we know that there exists some value ￿0 2 (0;1)
such that RHS(￿0;￿0) = ￿(￿W
A ;H). Thus, ￿0 is the critical discount factor for the limiting case
in which ￿ = 1=2. Since in this case shocks are transitory, we know that ￿0 is in fact the critical
discount factor derived in (19) when ￿H = 1=2 for the repeated game with transitory shocks. Now
suppose that we lower ￿ to the value ￿1 2 (0;1=2). As shown in Figure 7, using the properties
described above we can ￿nd a new critical discount factor, ￿1, such that RHS(￿1;￿1) = ￿(￿W
A ;H).
Consistent with (32), we see that the critical discount factor is higher as ￿ is lowered: ￿1 2 (￿0;1).
Continuing this process one more time, we may lower ￿ from ￿1 to ￿2 and thereby determine a new
critical discount factor ￿2, where ￿2 2 (￿1;1). Finally, as ￿ gets close to zero, the critical discount
factor must get close to unity (so that the RHS curve in Figure 7 becomes almost vertical). In
this general way, we may construct the critical discount factor, ￿W
A (￿), as a function of ￿.
We may now summarize our ￿ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 11: Consider the dynamic game with imperfectly persistent shocks. For all ￿ 2
(0;1=2), there exists ￿W
A (￿) 2 (0;1) such that (i) for all ￿ ￿ ￿W
A (￿), there exists a weak-binding
equilibrium in which the weak binding is set at the optimal weak binding, ￿W
A , and (ii) for all
37￿ < ￿W
A (￿), there does not exist a weak-binding equilibrium in which the weak binding is set at
the optimal weak binding, ￿W
A . The critical discount factor, ￿W
A (￿), is strictly decreasing in ￿,
approaches unity as ￿ approaches zero, and approaches the critical discount factor de￿ned in (19)
when ￿H = 1=2 for the repeated game with transitory shocks as ￿ approaches 1=2.
Governments can thus enforce a weak-binding equilibrium in which the weak binding is set at the
optimal weak binding if they are su¢ ciently patient, where greater patience is required when types
are more persistent. In particular, a government with a low type can then apply its Nash tari⁄ and
reveal that it is weak without inducing the other government to cheat in the following period, since
the latter government recognizes that the former government will one day be strong again. When
￿ is close to 1=2, types are essentially transitory, and our ￿ndings are similar to those derived for
the repeated game with transitory shocks. Likewise, when ￿ is close to zero, types are essentially
permanent, and our ￿ndings are analogous to those derived for the dynamic game with perfectly
persistent shocks. Indeed, when ￿ is close to zero, the critical discount factor is close to unity; thus,
in this case, governments can enforce a weak-binding equilibrium in which the weak binding is set
at the optimal weak binding if and only if they have approximately unlimited patience.
As Proposition 11 con￿rms, for a given ￿ 2 (0;1=2), if the discount factor falls below ￿W
A (￿),
then there does not exist a weak-binding equilibrium that uses the optimal weak binding. As in
Proposition 7 for the repeated game with transitory shocks, we may then construct a weak-binding
equilibrium in which the weak binding is set at a level that is above the optimal weak binding. A
higher bound tari⁄ rate reduces the incentive to cheat for a government with a high type, since
the higher bound enables such a government to apply a tari⁄ closer to its Nash tari⁄. Similarly,
if we ￿x any level of patience ￿ 2 (0;1) and increase the level of persistence, then we encounter a
critical level of persistence such that governments can enforce a weak-binding equilibrium only if
they set the weak binding strictly above the optimal weak binding. The divergence between the
bound tari⁄ and the applied tari⁄ of a government with a low type increases as the tari⁄ binding
is raised. The analysis here thus leads to the following prediction: when types are more persistent,
larger and more persistent divergences between applied and bound tari⁄s may be observed.
For a ￿xed level of patience, if types are very persistent, even the ￿most-cooperative￿weak-
binding equilibrium o⁄ers only a modest improvement on the Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, in this
case, when a government has a high type and infers that its trading partner￿ s type was low in
the previous period, this government cannot be deterred from cheating unless the bound tari⁄ is
su¢ ciently close to its Nash tari⁄. This observation captures one sense in which the enforcement
problem highlighted in our analysis of the dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks exerts an
in￿ uence as well in the dynamic game with imperfectly persistent shocks. If governments were to
face such a situation, it is conceivable that they might attempt to enforce a pooling equilibrium in
which the applied tari⁄ always equals the bound rate. Their behavior would then be analagous to
that described in Proposition 10 for the dynamic game with perfectly persistent types.
We next consider the role of private information for the ￿ndings in Proposition 11. Under the
alternative assumption that types are publicly observed, a weak-binding equilibrium with ￿W = ￿W
A
38exists if and only if a government would not gain from an o⁄-schedule deviation when its current
type is high and the current type of its trading partner is low. The critical discount factor is thus
de￿ned by ￿(￿W
A ;H) = ￿VHL < RHS(￿;￿), where the inequality uses (29) and (31). Intuitively,
if types are publicly observed, a government may observe that its trading partner is weak in the
current period; however, if types are privately observed, a government can only infer that its
trading partner was weak in the preceding period. When types are imperfectly persistent, the
trading partner￿ s expected future retaliatory capacity is smaller in the former scenario. We can
thus show that the critical discount factor is higher if government types are publicly observable.28
In this sense, greater transparency as to governments￿preferences may make cooperation harder.
7 Gradualism and Dynamic Screening
In this section, we consider again the dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks; however, we
now consider a new class of equilibria, in which governments reach successive agreements over time
with regard to bound tari⁄ rates. In particular, we allow that the tari⁄s applied by governments
in the course of satisfying the weak binding of the ￿rst agreement may a⁄ect the weak bindings
that governments negotiate in the second agreement. We thus refer to such equilibria as ￿history-
dependent weak-binding equilibria.￿Allowing for any discount factor, we construct an equilibrium
of this kind that o⁄ers higher-than-Nash welfare for both governments for every possible pair of
types that governments may have. The equilibrium entails dynamic screening and is suggestive of
a new information-based theory of gradualism in trade agreements.
We also consider the dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks in Section 5. We observe
there that weak-binding equilibria partition the public history into ￿good￿and ￿bad￿histories and
thus allow for limited history dependence. We now allow for a small degree of additional history
dependence. To this end, we consider the possibility of an equilibrium that can be described
in terms of a weak binding for period one, ￿W
1 , and a function, ￿W
2 (￿1;￿￿
1), that determines the
weak binding for a government in periods t = 2;:::;1 as a function of the tari⁄s ￿1 and ￿￿
1 that




1 . We refer to ￿W
1 as the ￿rst-period weak binding. For ￿1 ￿ ￿W
1 and ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿W
1 , we refer to
￿W
2 (￿1;￿￿
1) as a government￿ s induced second-period weak binding, where it is understood that the
￿second period￿weak binding is used in all periods t ￿ 2.
As before, if a government applies a tari⁄in excess of its weak binding, then in all future periods
governments abandon cooperation and apply Nash tari⁄s. Thus, if either government￿ s ￿rst-period
applied tari⁄ exceeds the ￿rst-period weak binding, then governments revert to Nash play in the
second and all later periods; likewise, a reversion to Nash play begins in period t+1 if in any period
t ￿ 2 a government applies a tari⁄ in excess of its induced second-period weak binding.
We may interpret the ￿rst-period and induced second-period weak bindings as corresponding
28De￿ne RHS(￿;￿) ￿ ￿VHL. We ￿nd that RHS(￿;￿) is strictly increasing in ￿, RHS(￿;￿) < RHS(￿;￿) for all
￿ 2 (0;1=2); and RHS(￿;￿) = RHS(￿;￿) for ￿ 2 f0;1=2g. RHS(￿;￿) is also strictly increasing in ￿ if RHS(￿;￿) > 0.
We can now proceed as above and characterize a critical discount factor ￿
W
A (￿), where ￿
W
A (￿) > ￿
W
A (￿).
39to two trade agreements. The ￿rst agreement is negotiated at date zero and determines a common
weak binding, ￿W
1 , for both governments in period one. The second agreement is negotiated at the
end of period one and thus after the public observation of period-one applied tari⁄s. If governments
apply di⁄erent tari⁄s in period one, then they may negotiate di⁄erent weak bindings in the period-
two agreement. In particular, if governments have di⁄erent types, then it is possible that they both
satisfy the weak-binding requirement in period one and yet apply di⁄erent tari⁄s in that period.
While the de￿nition of a weak-binding equilibrium would require that future applied tari⁄s are
independent of the particular ways in which governments satisfy their ￿rst-period weak binding,
we introduce here some additional history dependence and allow that the induced second-period
weak bindings may re￿ ect the particular ways in which governments satisfy their ￿rst-period weak
binding. In other words, di⁄erent ￿good￿histories may now be associated with di⁄erent induced
weak bindings in the second agreement.
For the dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks, we de￿ne a history-dependent weak-
binding equilibrium as an equilibrium in which there exists ￿W
1 and ￿W
2 (￿1;￿￿
1) such that (i) along
the equilibrium path, in period one governments apply tari⁄s that are equal to or below their ￿rst-
period weak binding, ￿W
1 , and in any period t ￿ 2 governments apply tari⁄s that are equal to or




1;￿1); and (ii) for
any ￿1 ￿ ￿W
1 and ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿W
1 and t ￿ 3, the tari⁄s that governments apply in period t are independent
of the public history of applied tari⁄s in periods e t = 2;:::;t ￿ 1, so long as no government has
applied a tari⁄ in any period e t in excess of its induced second-period weak binding.
With the notion of a history-dependent weak-binding equilibrium, we thus allow that ￿rst-period
tari⁄s a⁄ect the determination of the induced second-period weak bindings and thereby the tari⁄s
that are applied in future periods: In e⁄ect, starting in the second period, government behavior
must be described by a weak-binding equilibrium, once that concept is generalized slightly to allow
for asymmetric weak bindings. But the second-period weak bindings themselves represent a new
channel for history dependence.
To understand the value of a history-dependent weak-binding equilibrium, it is helpful to recall
the limited scope for cooperation in a weak-binding equilibrium when types are perfectly persistent.
In such an equilibrium, a single weak binding, ￿W, is used, regardless of the governments￿types.
For ￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)), a government with a low type is unable to retaliate in an e⁄ective way,
since it would apply ￿N(L) whether or not its partner had previously violated the agreement. This
leads to an enforcement problem in period two, if the government￿ s period-one applied tari⁄reveals
its type and the trading partner has a high type. As established in Proposition 8, a weak-binding
equilibrium with ￿W 2 (￿N(L);￿N(H)) thus fails to exist. Suppose now, though, that governments
have the opportunity to negotiate a new agreement in period two. They might then set a weak
binding below ￿N(L) for a government that has revealed itself to have a low type and a di⁄erent
weak binding below ￿N(H) for a government that has revealed itself to be a high type. Starting
in period two, each government would then have the capacity to retaliate in an e⁄ective manner,
since a government￿ s bound tari⁄ is below its optimal tari⁄, regardless of the government￿ s type.
40This intuition could be formalized in several ways. Here, we construct a simple history-dependent
weak-binding equilibrium in which governments achieve greater-than-Nash welfare regardless of
their types and for any positive discount factor. In the constructed equilibrium, the ￿rst-period
weak binding is ￿W
1 = ￿N(H). The induced second-period weak binding for a government is then
￿N(H) ￿ ￿H if this government￿ s ￿rst-period applied tari⁄ is ￿N(H), where ￿H > 0. If instead
a government￿ s ￿rst-period applied tari⁄ is strictly below ￿N(H), then the induced second-period
weak binding for this government is ￿N(L) ￿ ￿L, where ￿L > 0. The proposed system of weak
bindings is simple, in that a government￿ s induced second-period weak binding depends on its
applied ￿rst-period tari⁄ and not on that of its trading partner.
Consider now the tari⁄s that governments apply under this binding system. If ￿H is su¢ ciently
small, then the best option in the ￿rst period for a government with a high type is to apply its Nash
tari⁄, ￿N(H). By doing so, the government achieves its optimal tari⁄ in period one and induces a
second-period weak binding that is only slightly below its Nash tari⁄. For ￿H su¢ ciently small,
the government￿ s best choice in all future periods is to apply a tari⁄ equal to the induced second-
period weak binding, ￿N(H)￿￿H. Intuitively, the gain from cheating to ￿N(H) is ￿second-order,￿
since Wx(￿;H) is maximized at ￿ = ￿N(H); moreover, regardless of the trading partner￿ s type, the
future welfare cost to a government of cheating and triggering a reversion to Nash tari⁄s is ￿￿rst-
order,￿since the government￿ s welfare declines strictly when the trading partner￿ s tari⁄ increases
by ￿H > 0 or ￿L > 0. In particular, even a trading partner with a low type can now retaliate
e⁄ectively, because its induced second-period weak binding, ￿N(L) ￿ ￿L, is below its Nash tari⁄.
Likewise, when ￿L is su¢ ciently small, the best choice for government with a low type is to apply
its optimal tari⁄, ￿N(L), in period one and then apply a tari⁄ equal to its induced second-period
weak binding, ￿N(L) ￿ ￿L, in all future periods. Such a government would enjoy strictly lower
welfare, for example, if it were to mimic the high type and apply ￿N(H) in period one and then
apply ￿N(L) in all future periods. When ￿L is su¢ ciently small, such mimicry entails a ￿rst-order
welfare loss in period one and only second-order discounted welfare gains in future periods.
We may now state the following proposition:
Proposition 12: Consider the dynamic game with perfectly persistent shocks. For ￿H > 0 and
￿L > 0 su¢ ciently small, there exists a history-dependent weak-binding equilibrium with a ￿rst-
period weak binding ￿W




1 ￿ ￿N(H), ￿W
2 (￿1;￿￿
1) = ￿N(H)￿￿H when ￿1 = ￿N(H) and ￿W
2 (￿1;￿￿
1) = ￿N(L)￿￿L when
￿1 < ￿N(H). Along the equilibrium path, for ￿ 2 fL;Hg, a government with type ￿ applies the
tari⁄ ￿N(￿) in period one and the tari⁄ ￿N(￿)￿￿￿ in period two and all subsequent periods. For
all possible types that governments may realize, each government enjoys strictly higher discounted
welfare in the constructed history-dependent weak-binding equilibrium than they would were they to
apply Nash tari⁄s in all periods.
The full details of the proof are provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 12 captures a form of dynamic screening. With their ￿rst-period applied tari⁄s,
41governments reveal their types in period one. They then agree upon new weak bindings in period
two which re￿ ect this information. The constructed equilibrium can be interpreted as a form of
gradualism in trade agreements.29 The ￿rst-period agreement uses a single and high weak binding.
After observing the tari⁄s that are applied under this agreement, and making the appropriate
inferences, governments then negotiate a new agreement in period two in which the weak bindings
are further lowered. The negotiated reduction in the weak binding is greater if a government has a
low type and thus applies a ￿rst period tari⁄ that is strictly below the ￿rst-period weak binding.
All governments apply their bound tari⁄s in the second period.
An interesting implication of the constructed equilibrium is thus that the extent of ￿binding
overhang￿ may be greater in early negotiation rounds. This implication suggests, for example,
that the degree of binding overhang may have diminished over time for original GATT members.
Given that many developing countries joined the WTO as part of the most recent (Uruguay) round
of negotiations, this implication also suggests a potential interpretation for the observation that
the extent of binding overhang is currently greater among developing countries.30 At the same
time, we caution that the constructed equilibrium has not been shown to be the most-cooperative
history-dependent weak-binding equilibrium.
8 Conclusion
We consider the design of self-enforcing trade agreements among governments with private infor-
mation about the political pressures that they face. By limiting tari⁄s, a trade agreement can
reduce the standard ine¢ ciencies that are associated with the terms-of-trade externality. Further,
if a trade agreement allows governments some discretion when setting tari⁄s, then it can facilitate
better matching between a government￿ s applied tari⁄s and its political pressures. To explore these
roles for trade agreements, we examine a static model and a sequence of dynamic models. The
dynamic models are distinguished by the extent to which the private information that governments
possess is persistent through time. In this context, we argue that an agreement to use a weak
binding o⁄ers important advantages over other alternatives. We note, though, that governments
may hesitate to fully exploit the bene￿cial ￿downward discretion￿that such an agreement allows,
if private information is persistent relative to the patience of governments. In particular, if a gov-
ernment is perceived as ￿weak,￿then it cannot threaten e⁄ective retaliation; thus, an agreement to
apply the tari⁄s induced by the optimal weak binding may not be self-enforcing. We also consider
some ways in which governments might respond to the associated ￿ratchet e⁄ect.￿For example,
our analysis suggests a new information-based theory of gradualism in trade agreements.
Several important extensions await. First, we consider a model in which each country imports
one good and exports another good, whereas in reality countries import and export many goods.
29An alternative interpretation is that governments have no agreement in period one and apply their tari⁄s with
an understanding that their period-one choices may impact the bindings that are negotiated in period two as part of
a trade agreement.
30For an empirical analysis of binding overhang, see Bchir, Sebastien and Laborde (2005).
42Most of our results extend to the multi-good context in a straightforward fashion.31 In some cases,
though, the multi-good extension introduces new and interesting considerations. In particular,
it would be interesting to examine the possibility of pooling equilibria in the dynamic game with
perfectly persistent shocks, when multiple goods are traded. When governments attempt to use the
applied tari⁄s induced by the optimal weak binding, a ratchet e⁄ect again arises if a government has
a low type for a su¢ cient number of its goods; however, in the multi-good case, a government may
be able to hide its weakness to a su¢ cient degree, by pooling and applying the bound tari⁄ rate
for many but not all products. Second, in the two-type framework analyzed in this paper, there is
little scope for analyzing trade agreements with weak bindings (downward discretion) and safeguard
rules (upward discretion). Important future work might consider a model with more than two types
where the types exhibit some persistence over time. Such a framework might also o⁄er insight with
respect to WTO remedies, which occur along the equilibrium path when a government exercises
upward discretion. Finally, an important task for future work is to characterize and interpret the
optimal form of gradualism in self-enforcing trade agreements among governments with persistent
private information. An analysis of this kind could provide an interpretation for ￿foot-dragging￿
and other dynamic bargaining tactics that are observed in GATT/WTO negotiations.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: To prove (i), let ￿￿(￿H) ￿ ￿S
A￿E￿N(￿) = ￿E(E￿)￿E￿N(￿): Using (3) and (4),
￿￿(0) = ￿E(L) ￿ ￿N(L) < 0 and ￿￿(1) = ￿E(H) ￿ ￿N(H) < 0. Calculations con￿rm ￿
00
￿(￿H) > 0: Thus,







x(￿N(￿)). Observe ￿W ￿
x(0) = W￿
x(￿E(L))￿W￿




0. Calculations con￿rm ￿
00
W ￿
x(￿H) < 0. Thus, for all ￿H 2 (0;1), ￿W ￿
x(￿H) > 0. QED







A ￿ ￿N(L))(2 + ￿S
A + ￿N(L)) + J(￿N(L);H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H): (33)
Second, using (33), we can con￿rm that ￿ is strictly convex in ￿H. Third, if ￿H is set at a value such that
￿S
A = ￿N(L), then ￿ = ￿H
@￿
@￿H .
We now prove part (i). Referring to Figure 2, given that H and L are such that L(H;1) > L > LN(H),
they reside in Region A. Since L(H;￿H) strictly increases as ￿H rises, there exists e ￿H 2 (1=3;1) such that
L = L(H;e ￿H). For all ￿H 2 (e ￿H;1), L < L(H;￿H), and so ￿S
A > ￿N(L) is satis￿ed. If ￿H = e ￿H, then
￿S
A = ￿N(L): Using (33), we would then have @￿
@￿H = J(￿N(L);H)￿J(￿N(H);H) > 0, where the inequality
follows since L > LN(H). Using the third property of ￿, it follows that ￿ > 0 when ￿H = e ￿H; thus, ￿ > 0
for all ￿H 2 (e ￿H;1).
Consider next part (ii). Referring again to Figure 2, given that H and L are such that LN(H) > L, they
reside in Region B. As before, since L(H;￿H) strictly increases as ￿H rises, there exists e ￿H 2 (1=3;1) such
that L = L(H;e ￿H). For all ￿H 2 (e ￿H;1), L < L(H;￿H), and so ￿S
A > ￿N(L) is satis￿ed. If ￿H = e ￿H, then
￿S
A = ￿N(L): Using (33), we would then have @￿
@￿H = J(￿N(L);H)￿J(￿N(H);H) < 0, where the inequality
follows since LN(H) > L. Using the third property of ￿, it follows that ￿ < 0 when ￿H = e ￿H. By the
de￿nition of ￿, when ￿H = 1, we have that ￿ = J(￿E(H);H) ￿ J(￿N(H);H) > 0. Since ￿ is strictly
convex in ￿H, there exists a unique value b ￿H 2 (e ￿H;1) such that for all ￿H 2 (e ￿H;b ￿H), ￿ < 0 while for all
￿H 2 (b ￿H;1), ￿ > 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 4: When governments agree to use the optimal weak binding, they apply the
tari⁄s ￿N(L) and ￿W
A = ￿E(H) < ￿N(H) in the low- and high-type states, respectively. It follows that
the expected Nash tari⁄ is strictly higher than the expected applied tari⁄ when governments agree to
use the optimal weak binding. To establish the second part of the proposition, we de￿ne ￿￿W(￿H) ￿
￿H￿E(H) + (1 ￿ ￿H)￿N(L) ￿ ￿S
A = ￿H￿E(H) + (1 ￿ ￿H)￿N(L) ￿ ￿E(E￿): Using (3) and (4), we ￿nd
45￿￿W(0) = ￿N(L)￿￿E(L) > 0 and ￿￿W(1) = ￿E(H)￿￿E(H) = 0. Calculations con￿rm ￿
00
￿(￿H) < 0: Thus,
for all ￿H 2 (0;1), ￿￿W(￿H) > 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 6: Assume (12) holds. We now de￿ne a relaxed program:
max
￿(￿)
EJ(￿(￿);￿) s.t. ￿(H) ￿ ￿(L) and Wx(￿(L);L) ￿ Wx(￿(H);L):
To see that this program is a relaxation of the second-best program, recall (6) implies the applied tari⁄
schedule is nondecreasing and note the relaxed program omits the constraint Wx(￿(H);H) ￿ Wx(￿(L);H).
We solve the relaxed program by establishing three claims. We then verify that the omitted constraint is
automatically satis￿ed and thus that we have solved the second-best program as well.
Our ￿rst claim is as follows: When (12) holds, at any solution ￿(￿) to the relaxed program, Wx(￿(L);L) =
Wx(￿(H);L). To establish this claim, suppose Wx(￿(L);L) > Wx(￿(H);L) at a solution to the relaxed
program. Under this supposition, ￿(H) > ￿(L) is necessary. Now, if ￿(L) 6= ￿E(L), then we could move the
applied tari⁄ for the low type slightly towards ￿E(L) and achieve a higher value for expected joint welfare,
while still satisfying all of the constraints of the relaxed program. Thus, ￿(L) = ￿E(L) is necessary. A
similar argument applies for the high type. Thus, under our supposition, a solution to the relaxed program
must satisfy ￿(L) = ￿E(L) and ￿(H) = ￿E(H). But this leads to a contradiction, since the e¢ cient tari⁄
schedule fails to satisfy the relaxed program￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint when (12) holds.
Our second claim is slightly stronger: When (12) holds, at any solution ￿(￿) to the relaxed program,
Wx(￿(L);L) = Wx(￿(H);L) and ￿(H) > ￿(L). To establish this claim, we need only show that a solution
to the relaxed program cannot set ￿(H) = ￿(L). The constant tari⁄ schedule that maximizes expected
joint welfare entails ￿(H) = ￿(L) = ￿E(E￿). As established in Proposition 3, expected joint welfare would
be higher if ￿(H) = ￿E(H) > ￿N(L) = ￿(L), where the inequality follows from our parameter restriction.
These applied tari⁄s satisfy the constraints of the relaxed program.
We come now to our third claim: When (12) holds, at any solution ￿(￿) to the relaxed program,
￿E(L) < ￿(L) < ￿N(L) and ￿E(H) < ￿(H): To establish this claim, we begin by using our second claim
to see that a solution must satisfy Wx(￿(L);L) = Wx(￿(H);L) and ￿(H) > ￿N(L) > ￿(L). Thus, ￿(H)
must be the ￿￿ ipside￿of ￿(L) along the (concave) function Wx(￿;L). Let ￿E(L) be the ￿ ipside of ￿E(L):
Thus, Wx(￿E(L);L) = Wx(￿E(L);L) and ￿E(L) > ￿N(L) > ￿E(L). When (12) holds, Wx(￿E(L);L) <
Wx(￿E(H);L), and so ￿E(L) > ￿E(H) > ￿N(L), where the last inequality uses our parameter restriction.
When (12) holds, we now establish that a solution to the relaxed program must satisfy ￿(L) > ￿E(L).
Suppose ￿rst that a solution entails ￿(L) < ￿E(L). Then ￿(H) must be the ￿ ipside of ￿(L), and so
￿(H) > ￿E(L) > ￿E(H) follows. Starting here, expected joint welfare could be strictly increased by raising
the tari⁄ assigned to the low type while likewise slightly decreasing the ￿ ipside tari⁄ that is assigned to
the high type. For small movements of this kind, both tari⁄s move toward their e¢ cient levels, and so
expected joint welfare is strictly higher. Since these adjusted tari⁄s also satisfy the constraints of the relaxed
program, we conclude that ￿(L) ￿ ￿E(L). Suppose second that a solution entails ￿(L) = ￿E(L) and
thus ￿(H) = ￿E(L). Now consider again a slight increase in the tari⁄ assigned to the low type with a
corresponding slight decrease in the ￿ ipside tari⁄ that is assigned to the high type. For a small change, the
change in the low-type tari⁄ has no ￿rst-order e⁄ect on expected joint welfare, since the tari⁄ for the low
type is initially set at the e¢ cient level for this type. The change in the tari⁄ for the high type, however,
generates a ￿rst-order increase in expected welfare, since the tari⁄ for the high type is initially above the
level that is e¢ cient for this type. We thus conclude that ￿(L) > ￿E(L).
When (12) holds, we next establish that a solution to the relaxed program must satisfy ￿(H) > ￿E(H).
Suppose ￿rst that ￿N(L) < ￿(H) < ￿E(H). Let ￿(L) be the (lower) ￿ ipside of ￿(H), in that ￿(L) < ￿(H)
and Wx(￿(L);L) = Wx(￿(H);L). From here, we may consider a slight increase in the tari⁄ for the high
46type that is accompanied by a ￿ ipside decrease in the tari⁄ for the low type. The modi￿ed tari⁄s continue
to satisfy the constraints of the relaxed program. They also generate strictly higher expected joint welfare,
since for each type the tari⁄is moved in the direction of the e¢ cient tari⁄. We conclude that ￿(H) ￿ ￿E(H).
Suppose second that a solution entails ￿(H) = ￿E(H) and thus ￿(L) = ￿E(H) where ￿E(H) is the (lower)
￿ ipside of ￿E(H). From here, we may increase slightly the tari⁄ for the high type while likewise decreasing
slightly the (lower) ￿ ipside tari⁄for the low type. The former adjustment has no ￿rst-order e⁄ect on expected
joint welfare, since the tari⁄ for the high type is initially set at the e¢ cient level for this type. The latter
adjustment, however, generates a ￿rst-order increase in expected joint welfare, since the tari⁄ for the low
type is initially above the level that is e¢ cient for this type. We thus conclude that ￿(H) > ￿E(H). This
completes the proof of our third claim.
We establish in our third claim that the solution to the relaxed program satsi￿es the inequalities stated
in the proposition. We now show that the solution to the relaxed program satis￿es the omitted incen-
tive constraint and thus is also the solution to the second-best program. Recall from our ￿rst claim
that the solution to the relaxed program satsi￿es Wx(￿(L);L) = Wx(￿(H);L) and ￿(H) > ￿(L). Thus,
Wx(￿(H);H) = Wx(￿(H);L) + (H ￿ L)f(￿(H)) = Wx(￿(L);L) + (H ￿ L)f(￿(H)) = Wx(￿(L);H) + (H ￿
L)[f(￿(H)) ￿ f(￿(L))] > Wx(￿(L);H); where the inequality follows since H > L, ￿(H) > ￿(L) and f0 > 0.
The omitted incentive constraint is thus satis￿ed. Finally, as we establish above and as Figure 3 illustrates,
L(H;1) lies strictly above LFB(H) which in turn lies strictly above L(H;1=2). It follows that there exists
some critical e ￿H 2 (1=2;1) such that for all ￿H 2 (e ￿H;1) there exists values for L and H that satisfy (12)
and our parameter restriction. QED
Properties of RHS(￿;￿): Using (28), we ￿nd that
RHS(￿;￿) = ￿f
ALH￿[2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ 2￿)] + AHL[1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ 2￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ 2￿))
g: (34)

















ALH(1 ￿ 2￿)(2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ 2￿)) ￿ AHL
(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ 2￿))2 g > 0: (36)
An implication of (35) and (36) is that, for all ￿ 2 (0;1) there exists ￿
￿ 2 (0;1=2) such that RHS(￿
￿;￿) = 0.
We observe that ￿
￿ must satisfy h(￿;￿) = 0 where h(￿;￿) ￿ ALH￿[2(1￿￿)￿￿(1￿2￿)]+AHL[1￿￿￿￿(1￿2￿)]
is the numerator of the fraction in (34). We may verify that h￿(￿;￿) > 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1=2] and ￿ 2 [0;1].32
We ￿nd that h￿(￿;￿) > 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1=2) and ￿ 2 [0;1], where h￿(￿;￿) = 0 when ￿ = 1=2.33 Since
￿





h￿(￿￿;￿) < 0: Since h(￿;1) = ￿AHH, it is clear
32Observe that h￿(￿;￿) = ￿4￿ALH(1 ￿ ￿) + AHH + (1 ￿ ￿)(ALH ￿ 2AHL) ￿ h￿(1=2;￿) = AHL(2￿ ￿ 1) + ALH￿.
Since AHL < 0, h￿(1=2;0) > 0. Notice also that h￿(1=2;1) = AHH > 0. Since h￿(1=2;￿) is linear in ￿, we conclude
that h￿(1=2;￿) > 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1], and it thus follows that h￿(￿;￿) > 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1=2] and ￿ 2 [0;1].
33We ￿nd that h￿(￿;￿) = (2￿ ￿ 1)(ALH￿ + AHL); thus, h￿(0;￿) = ￿AHL > 0 and h￿(1=2;￿) = 0. We observe
further that h￿￿￿(￿;￿) = 4ALH > 0. Thus, if we could show that h￿￿(1=2;￿) < 0; then we would have that
h￿￿(￿;￿) < 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1=2]. Given that h￿(0;￿) > 0 = h￿(1=2;￿), we could then conclude that h￿(￿;￿) > 0
for all ￿ 2 [0;1=2). We ￿nd that h￿￿(1=2;￿) = ALH + 2AHL. Substituting and simplifying, we can show that





47that, for ￿ close to unity, ￿
￿ must be close to zero. Likewise, since h(￿;0) = (1 ￿ ￿)[2￿ALH + AHL], as ￿
gets close to zero, ￿
￿ must be close to the value ￿AHL
2ALH < 1=2, where the inequality follows from AHH > 0.
We next consider how RHS(￿;￿) is a⁄ected by changes in ￿. Given we have de￿ned h(￿;￿) so that
RHS(￿;￿) ￿ ( ￿
1￿￿)(
h(￿;￿)
(1￿￿(1￿2￿))), we can derive that
@RHS(￿;￿)
@￿
> 0 for all ￿ 2 [￿
￿;1=2]: (37)
The strict inequality in (37) follows from our ￿ndings above, where we establish that: (i) h￿(￿;￿) > 0 for all
￿ 2 [0;1=2) and h￿(1=2;￿) = 0; and (ii) h(￿;￿) > 0 for ￿ 2 (￿
￿;1=2] and h(￿
￿;￿) ￿ 0 where ￿
￿ 2 (0;1=2)
for all ￿ 2 [0;1). We conclude that RHS(￿;￿) is strictly increasing in ￿ if ￿ ￿ ￿
￿. For lower values of ￿,
RHS(￿;￿) may not increase with ￿. For example, we know from (35) that RHS(0;￿) = ￿
1￿￿AHL < 0, and
so RHS(0;￿) strictly decreases in ￿. It is straightforward to show that
@
2RHS(￿;￿)
@￿@￿ > 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1=2].
Proof of Proposition 12: To begin, consider any period t ￿ 2 and suppose that a government has a high
type. First, suppose that the government and its trading partner have both behaved as high types in all
previous periods (i.e., each government applied ￿N(H) in period one and ￿N(H) ￿ ￿H in all subsequent
periods). In period t, the most attractive deviation for the government is to cheat by applying the tari⁄
￿N(H). It then enjoys a one-period gain of ￿(￿N(H) ￿ ￿H;H) and triggers a reversion to Nash tari⁄s in
all future periods. Given that the trading partner is believed to have a high type, the o⁄-schedule constraint
can be written as ￿(￿N(H) ￿ ￿H;H) ￿ ￿
1￿￿[W￿
x(￿N(H) ￿ ￿H) ￿ W￿
x(￿N(H)) ￿ ￿(￿N(H) ￿ ￿H;H)], or
Wx(￿N(H);H) ￿ Wx(￿N(H) ￿ ￿H;H) ￿ ￿[W￿
x(￿N(H) ￿ ￿H) ￿ W￿
x(￿N(H))]: (38)
The LHS and RHS of (38) are zero when ￿H = 0; further, the derivative of the LHS with respect to ￿H is
zero at ￿H = 0, while for ￿ > 0 the derivative of the RHS with respect to ￿H is positive at ￿H = 0. We
thus conclude that (38) holds for ￿H > 0 su¢ ciently small.
Second, suppose that the government has behaved as a high type in all previous periods, and that its
trading partner has behaved as a low type in all previous periods (i.e., the government applied ￿N(H) in
period one and ￿N(H)￿￿H in all subsequent periods, and the trading partner applied ￿N(L) in period one
and ￿N(L)￿￿L in all subsequent periods). In period t, the most attractive deviation for the government is
to cheat by applying the tari⁄ ￿N(H). It then enjoys a one-period gain of ￿(￿N(H) ￿ ￿H;H) and triggers
a reversion to Nash tari⁄s in all future periods. Given that the trading partner is believed to have a low
type, the o⁄-schedule constraint can be written as
Wx(￿N(H);H) ￿ Wx(￿N(H) ￿ ￿H;H) ￿ ￿[W￿
x(￿N(L) ￿ ￿L) ￿ W￿
x(￿N(L))]: (39)
The LHS and RHS of (39) are zero when ￿H = ￿L = 0; further, the derivative of the LHS with respect to
￿H is zero at ￿H = 0, while for ￿ > 0 the derivative of the RHS with respect to ￿L is positive at ￿L = 0.
We thus conclude that (39) holds for ￿H > 0 and ￿L > 0 su¢ ciently small.
We note that exactly analogous arguments apply for any period t ￿ 2 when the government has a low
type and has behaved accordingly in all previous periods, while its trading partner has a low or high type
and has behaved accordingly in all previous periods as well.
For t ￿ 2, suppose next that a government has a high type and that its partner behaved as a high type
in period one (i.e., applied ￿N(H)) but in some later period deviated by applying a tari⁄ below its induced
second-period weak binding (i.e., below ￿N(H) ￿ ￿H). At this point, play has moved o⁄ the equilibrium
path, and for simplicity we may assume that the government has ￿passive beliefs￿and continues to believe
that its trading partner has a high type. Given this state of play, we may specify the equilibrium strategy
48so that a trading partner with a high type applies a tari⁄ equal to its induced second-period weak binding
in period t and thereafter, provided that the government continues to meet its induced second-period weak
binding. Given its belief and understanding of the equilibrium strategy, the relevant o⁄-schedule constraint
for the government is again described by (38), which we know holds for ￿H > 0 su¢ ciently small. A similar
argument applies if a government has a high type and its trading partner behaved as a low type in period one
(i.e., applied ￿N(L)) but in some later period deviated by applying a tari⁄ below its induced second-period
weak binding (i.e., below ￿N(L)￿￿L). In this case, we refer to (39) and conclude that the government will
not deviate for ￿H > 0 and ￿L > 0 su¢ ciently small. Likewise, for t ￿ 2, if a government has a low type
and its partner behaved as a low (high) type in period one and then later deviated by applying a tari⁄below
its induced second-period weak binding, then the government will not deviate from applying a tari⁄ equal
to its induced second-period weak binding, for ￿H > 0 and ￿L > 0 su¢ ciently small.
For t ￿ 2, another possibility is that the trading partner applied an equilibrium tari⁄in period one (either
￿N(L) or ￿N(H)) and later deviated by applying a tari⁄above its induced second-period weak binding. The
government￿ s best choice is then to revert to its Nash tari⁄s, since equilibrium strategies now require that
its trading partner apply Nash tari⁄s in all remaining periods independent of the government￿ s behavior.
For t ￿ 2, a ￿nal possibility is that the trading partner deviated to a non-Nash tari⁄ in period one. If
the trading partner applied a ￿rst-period tari⁄ in excess of ￿N(H), then the government anticipates that
its partner will apply Nash tari⁄s in all future periods, independent of the government￿ s behavior. The
government￿ s best choice is then to apply its Nash tari⁄ in all future periods. If the trading partner applied
a ￿rst-period tari⁄ below ￿N(H) but di⁄erent from ￿N(L), then we are o⁄ the equilibrium path and may
assume that the government believes its partner has the low type. Given this state of play, we may specify
the equilibrium strategy so that a trading partner with a low type applies a tari⁄equal to its induced second-
period weak binding, ￿N(L) ￿ ￿L, in period 2 and thereafter, provided that the government continues to
meet its induced second-period weak binding. Given its belief and understanding of the equilibrium strategy,
the relevant o⁄-schedule constraint for the government with a high type is again given by (39), which holds
for ￿H > 0 and ￿L > 0 su¢ ciently small. A similar argument applies if the government has a low type.
We now roll back to the ￿rst period. Whatever its type, a government applies its Nash tari⁄in equilibrium
in period one; thus, any deviation lowers its ￿rst-period welfare. If the deviation exceeds the ￿rst-period
weak binding, then it triggers Nash reversion and also lowers the government￿ s welfare in future periods,
for ￿H > 0 and ￿L > 0 su¢ ciently small. The gain to the government of applying its Nash tari⁄s in
future periods is second-order in size while the cost to the government of the application of Nash tari⁄s
by its trading partner is ￿rst-order in size. If the deviation is below the ￿rst-period weak binding, then
a government with a low type does not alter future play, while a government with a high type induces a
lower second-period weak binding than it would have otherwise and thus gains less under cooperation in the
future. Such a government might then apply its Nash tari⁄and cheat in the future; however, in that event, it
would have done better applying its Nash tari⁄ in all periods (including t = 1), and for ￿H > 0 and ￿L > 0
su¢ ciently small the equilibrium payo⁄s to such a government are higher yet. Finally, if a government with
a low type mimics the high type by applying ￿N(H), it can apply ￿N(L) rather than ￿N(L) ￿ ￿L in all
future periods. The discounted future gain is second-order in size, though, for ￿L > 0 su¢ ciently small.
Finally, we note that the constructed equilibrium generates greater discounted welfare for governments,
regardless of their types, than they receive under Nash play. This follows since, for any pair of types and
starting at Nash tari⁄s, each government enjoys a ￿rst-order gain from a small reduction in the tari⁄ of its
trading partner and experiences only a second-order loss from a small reduction in its own tari⁄. QED
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